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INTRODUCTION
Seventeenth-century England, characterized by a 
struggle for ascendancy among manifold ideological forces, 
is analogous to the present world, seemingly marked by a 
conflict among democracy, totalitarianism, and their var­
ious deviations. Today, however, the doctrine of force is 
often cunningly disguised under scores of seductive ap­
pellations, whereas in the seventeenth century this doc­
trine was more readily visible. It is remarkable, there­
fore, that the ghost of a man who terrorized certain in­
habitants of that past century still haunts the scholars 
of today, for at the present time at least a score of pol­
itical theorists and philosophers are arguing over what 
Thomas Hobbes really meant. Hobbes, a cynical old det'er- 
minist, has outlived his pious contemporaries. It is per­
haps also remarkable that a majority of the participants 
are from Hobbes’s own homeland, a country from which, at 
one time, Hobbes was forced to flee for his very. life.
The intellectual polemics concerning the political 
philosophy of Hobbes are the results of seemingly insoluble 
differences ,among the various schools of interpretation. 
From their first appearance Hobbes’s writings were inter­
preted in a relatively consistent manner. Since 1936, 
however, there has arisen a variety of new interpretations 
of his moral and political philosophy. These departures
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from the norm have been greeted by skepticism on the part 
of those who endorse the traditional interpretation. Skep­
ticism is rarely welcomed, and so the innovators in turn 
have been forced to strengthen their own positions.
This thesis is an attempt to examine the various 
interpretations and the controversies that have resulted 
from them by analyzing the works of representative au­
thors of these approaches. Only representative writings 
have been utilized, for an examination of everything' 
that has been written on Hobbes would be a task of im­
mense magnitude. It is necessary, however, to consider 
the philosopher in question before examining the various 
explications.
Hobbes’s experiences during his lifetime made a 
definite impression on his theories, for his life was 
unusual. Hobbes and fear were born twins, and it seems 
that fear plagued him the rest of his life. Upon hear­
ing rumors of the Spanish Armada, Hobbes's mother, a sim­
ple woman of yeoman stock, apparently thought that Mal­
mesbury, where she and her husband were then residing, 
would be the natural objective of the invading force.
The result was the premature birth of her son, Thomas, 
on April 5, 15$$*^ Not long after Thomas's birth, his 
father, a semi-literate Anglican vicar, was forced to
■̂ ■Sir Leslie Stephen, Hobbes{"English Men of Let­
ters"'; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1904), 3«
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flee into obscurity for striking a fellow parson at the 
church door at Westport. Fortunately for the Hobbes child­
ren they had a prosperous, childless uncle who assumed charge 
of the deserted family. At the age of four Hobbes was sent 
to a church school where he learned to read and write. When 
he became proficient in these tasks, he was enrolled in a 
Latin, school in Malmesbury. Because he was a precocious 
youngster, Hobbes entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford, at the age 
of fifteen. Magdalen Hall was at that time dominated by 
Puritanism. Hobbes left Oxford in 160$, thoroughly convinced 
that it was intellectually sterile. This feeling of contempt 
probably stemmed from two factors: firstly, Hobbes was not a 
good formal student, and secondly, Oxford was perhaps in' an 
intellectual ebb. In any event, upon graduation, Hobbes be­
came a tutor to young William Cavendish, later to become the 
second Earl of Devonshire. In 1610, Hobbes and his young 
pupil made a grand tour of Europe, concentrating on Italy 
and France. Upon returning to England, Hobbes spent the next 
eighteen years with the Cavendish family, reading the works 
of poets and historians. It was at this time that he became 
acquainted with Thucydides, a writer who greatly influenced 
Hobbes’s thought. Hobbes, by virtue of his-position, was al­
so able to associate with the great and near-great men of 
England. In 162$ the second Earl died, leaving a frugal 
widow who promptly curtailed expenses and dismissed Hobbes. 
Hobbes, forced to seek other means of support, obtained a
4
position as traveling tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clin­
ton. For the second time Hobbes and a pupil went on a grand 
tour. This time they stayed in France, and Hobbes entered 
French intellectual circles. It was also at this point that 
he was introduced to Euclid’s geometry. He was so amazed 
with Euclid that thenceforth he conceived philosophy from 
the scientific and mathematical side.^ In 1631 he was in­
vited to return from Paris to tutor the third Earl of Devon­
shire, a boy about fourteen years of age. Two years later, 
Hobbes went on his third grand tour of the continent. On 
this visit he met Galileo, who was living near Florence as 
a prisoner of the inquisition. After leaving Florence, 
Hobbes journeyed to Paris where he met Mersenne, a scientist 
whom he instantly admired. The third tour ended in 1637, 
and by this time Hobbes was becoming well known. Hobbes’s 
future was slowly being shaped.
Meanwhile, the political situation in England was
becoming more unstable. Parliament was in its eighth year
of suspension, and in the North the Scots were becoming
troublesome. In 1640, when Charles was forced to appeal
to parliament, Hobbes began his literary career. He wrote
a small pamphlet,A Short Tract on First Principles, in
which he declared that sovereignty was vested in the crown.
Hobbes felt that the Long Parliament might find time to 
-------------------I------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------- ;__________:________________ _ ________________________________________________
1Ibid., 19.
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deal with the author of this little treatise, so he fled to 
France, where he spent the next eleven years. The result of 
his growing interest in the civil war was De Give, finished 
in 1642. Apparently it was only intended for a few European 
scholars, for it was printed in Latin, and only a small num­
ber of copies were distributed. During this time he also 
wrote Elements of Law which, however, was not published in 
England until I65O. With De Cive out of the way, Hobbes 
began to compose the Leviathan, his major work. His writing 
was interrupted, however, when he was appointed mathematical 
tutor to the Prince of Wales, then an exile in Paris* In 
the middle of I65I. the Leviathan was finished, and was 
promptly published in English.-*- Doubtlessly, the Leviathan 
was intended for English readers.
When Charles II reached Paris after his defeat at 
Worcester, Hobbes, with all good intentions, presented him 
with a manuscript copy of the Leviathan. Unfortunately for 
Hobbes his book was not well received in the royal circles, 
so he was forced to retreat to England*^ Three months later 
Hobbes walked to an Anglican chapel and took the sacraments. 
He also made*his submission to the Council of State. There-
^All references to the Leviathan in this thesis 
will be to: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946)*
^Stephen, op. cit., 41®
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after, Hobbes remained in England. In 1653 Hobbes once 
again became a member of the Cavendish family, spending most 
of his time reading and writing in their small house, in Lon­
don. When Charles II returned to England, Hobbes arrived at 
the court and swore his allegiance.
Hobbes's ability as a polemicist was by this time 
firmly established, and he seemed to plunge into one contro­
versy after another. The old gentleman made the mistake of 
saying that he had squared the circle, whereupon he was promp 
tly "torn apart” by John Wallis, a mathematics professor at 
Oxford. Hobbes's prior denunciation of Oxford perhaps served 
to increase Wallis's vigor. In any event, Wallis remained 
Hobbes’s most formidable opponent for the rest of his life. 
The great plague of London occurred in 1665, and was followed 
the next year by the great fire. The great fire might be 
excused as being caused by the Papists, but surely they could 
never have been responsible for the plague. To the English 
this was undoubtedly a manifestation of divine wrath; and 
the most.satisfactory way of appeasement would be to rid the 
country of atheists. Hobbes began to worry when a bill was 
brought into Parliament for the suppression of atheism and 
profanity, and a committee was instructed to seek information 
concerning the Leviathan. Some of the bishops even made a' " l_" ■"1 -t ■
motion to have the old fellow burned at the stake. The fer­
vor, however, was only short-lived. But in any event, Hobbes 
went to church more regularly from that time on. In 166$
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Hobbes, by this time in his eightieth year, published the 
Behemoth. However, its publication was suppressed by Charles
II. Even at eighty, Hobbes was still taking an active part 
in the controversies he had fostered. After a few years 
Hobbes retired from taking part in intellectual disputations 
to a new type of occupation -- translating. In 1673 he pub­
lished a translation of the Voyage of Ulysses, followed a 
year later by complete translations of the Iliad and the 
Odyssey. It is remarkable that so old a man could translate 
such difficult text. Two years later Hobbes left London and 
moved, to the Cavendish country homes at Chatsworth and 
Hardwick. On December 4, 1679, he died T,...glad to find a 
hole to creep out of the world at.nl
Hobbes's entire life, then, was one of the mind; it 
was dedicated to the regime of thought. Outside of the intel­
lectual field his life was essentially placid. In analyzing 
Hobbes’s life one must remember that Hobbes was supported 
during its entirety by the English aristocracy. Consequently 
he could be an innocent bystander at the political events of 
his time. He owed no real allegiance to any faction in 
English politics, a factor that must be considered in inter- 
preting the Leviathan. And, fortunately for Hobbes as a pol­
itical theorist, he lived in one of the most violent and ex­
citing periods of English history.
g
As Hobbes did little formal reading, he could view 
events with a fresh eye, for he was not bound by the theories 
of the past. This lack of respect for tradition was perhaps 
valuable for Hobbes, who was trying to substitute a new scheme 
of thought, built upon entirely new foundations.
Hobbes’s experiences abroad also put a definite stamp 
on his thinking. In all, he spent about seventeen years on 
the continent, broken into four visits. On each visit he learn­
ed something new. The first made him aware that the Aristotel- 
ianism then taught in England was everywhere else * being aban­
doned. It also sent him back to the study of classical lan­
guages and their non-philosophical literature.1 On the sec­
ond trip he looked into a copy of Euclid's geometry and was 
so impressed by what he saw there that he used it as a basis 
for a system that would cover the whole spectrum of rational 
knowledge.^ On the third visit he began the study of natural 
philosophy, particularly under the influence of the scientist, 
Mersenne. By the time of his last visit, the result of vol­
untary exile, he was recognized by the great philosophers of 
France, a factor that contributed to his intellectual conceit.
Hobbes impressed English thought, then, almost en­
tirely by vigorous opposition, for the Leviathan was perhaps 
the*most un-English book ever written on the state by an
^T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes. No. 130("Writers and 
their Work"; London: Longmans, Green, I960), 10.
2Ibid.. 11.
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Englishman*1 It contradicted almost all the English ortho- 
doxies in politics, morals and religion. Because he was so 
unorthodox, the reaction of Hobbes's contemporaries was bel­
licose. John Watkins characterized the attitude of these 
critics in the following paragraphs
What was new and unheard-of to_.Hobbes’s 
contemporaries in De Give and the Leviathan 
was their sheer monstrousness. Angry bishops 
and royalists and Presbyterians did not com­
plain about Hobbes’s heavy emphasis on author­
ity in which they were staunch believers them­
selves. Where he had gone shockingly wrong in 
their eyes was in conceiving authority, not as 
something remote and august and touched by God, 
but as a bureaucratic engine of civil order 
built to the specifications of nakedly selfish 
human beings. They feared his ideas not be­
cause they were authoritarian, but because they 
were subversive of extra-human authority.
As time passed, however, the reaction became less
bitter, and Hobbes was not without his advocates. The first
was Spinoza, who adopted a considerable portion of Hobbes’s
political philosophy. In the eighteenth century Rousseau
took Hobbes’s view of law and transmuted it into his theory
of the general will. Even Marx was familiar with Hobbes’s
philosophy, having met it in Holbach. Europeans were not
the only ones who endorsed Hobbes’s ideas, however, for here
in America he had his disciples. Daniel Leonard used Hobbes’s
theories- to support Great Britain in the Revolution.1
1Ibid., 17.
W. N. Watkins, "The Posthumous Career of Thomas 
Hobbes," Review of Politics. XIX(1957), 352.
^Ibid., 354 et passim.
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Alexander Hamilton was also a Hobbesian in his concept of 
government. He favored an all-powerful presidency, and 
even after he became the Secretary of the Treasury he con­
tinued to insist on security and order as the primary func­
tions of the state.
It is difficult to explain why Hobbes has always 
held the interest of political theorists and other scholars, 
alike. Perhaps they are attracted to his writings because 
of their iconoclasm. Or perchance his harsh view of man 
and his denial of any transcendent good draw their attention. 
In any event, if a theorist may be judged by the duration of 
his effect, then Hobbes must be classified as a theorist of 
the first order.
CHAPTER I
THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION
The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, as mani­
fested in the Leviathan, has occasioned the rise of a stand­
ard interpretation that is commonly accepted as being correct. 
This interpretation owes its origins primarily to Hobbes’s 
contemporary critics, that is, it issued from Hobbes’s theo­
ries as those .theories impressed themselves on the minds of 
these contemporaries. The propagation and augmentation of 
this exegesis have been accomplished by various scholars of 
the subsequent centuries.
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine this 
interpretation of Hobbes’s theory by discussing the opinions 
of those seventeenth-century critics and the scholars of 
later years who are representative of this tradition.
Although these various savants have many differences, as 
the reader will easily note, the common thread which.runs 
through each opinion is sufficient to bind it to the tradi­
tional interpretation.
John Bowie, an Oxford scholar, ably discusses the 
opinions of certain contemporary censurers of Hobbes in his 
work entitled Hobbes and His Critics. These men, for the
I-John Edward Bowie, Hobbes and His Critics(New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1952). John Bowie, an astute histo-
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most part, were prominent and learned, and so their crit­
icisms of Hobbes have been well-respected throughout the 
years„ For the purposes of this survey, however, each crit­
ic will not be discussed in detail, instead only certain of 
their opinions will be considered. Bowie divides the crit­
icisms into four main categories.^ Firstly, he contends, 
all agree that Hobbes’s materialism is confounded by nat­
ural law. One will recall that the basis of Hobbes’s pol­
itical theory is a radical materialism, a crude behaviorist 
outlook that regards matter and motion alone as real.. Hen­
ce the metaphysical and religious sanctions of traditional
2political thought are only pretence to Hobbes. Like Marx,
he claimed to give a ’scientific* ex­
planation of human behavior, which he re­
garded as determined by reflex actions, 
and to provide a political theory which 
was based on conduct so determined.3
This concept of a materialist basis of society, however, 
only served to antagonize the critics of Hobbes’s age, be­
cause for them society and government were sanctioned by 
a mystical order. John Whitehall states, ’’what stuff this
rian,. was born in England in 1905» He obtained his education 
from Balliol College, Oxford, where he was a Brackenbury 
Scholar in 1924« He entered the teaching profession as a 
lecturer in modern history at Wadham College, Oxford. In 
1950 he was promoted to a professorship of political theory. 
His publications are numerous, including Western Political 
Thought. and The Unity of European History. Who* s Who (~Lon- 
don: Adam and Charles Black, I960), 322.
■^Bowle, op. cit., 186.
% b i d .. 44«
3lbid.
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is to ground any government upon...It is as full of damnable 
opinions as a toad is of p o i s o n , I n  Lord Clarendon* s op­
inion Hobbes’s state would not stand, for it would command
2no "awful veneration." Philip Hunton regards sovereignty
as an "indivisible beam of divine protection/’ since it re-
fleets a cosmic order*/ The faith of the critics in the
%traditional laws of nature is illustrated by Archbishop 
John Bramhall’s attack on Hobbes for his "gross mistake of 
the Laws of Nature,.,A moral Heathen would blush for shame 
to see such a catalogue of the Laws of Nature."^
Ibid,, 191. John Whitehall was perhaps the least 
high-minded of all the contemporary critics of Hobbes, An 
attorney educated in the Inner Temple, he supported the 
supremacy of law and property. Although a royalist, his at­
tack on Hobbes was from the viewpoint of a constitutional- 
1st, Ibid,? 35-38.
2Ibid, Edward Hyde, better known as the first Earl 
of Clarendon., was born in 1609 and died in 1674, He was ed­
ucated at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, from which he received a 
Bachelor of Arts degree in 1626, A man who held great pres­
tige, he favored the establishment of a constitutional mon­
archy, Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. X, ed, Sidney 
Lee(Londons Smith, Elder and Co.,19087V 370-389,
3Bowiej op. cit., I8 9. Philip Hunton was born in 
1604 and died in"1682.”” A scholarly critic, he received a 
Master of Arts degree from Wadham College, Oxford, in.l629» 
In I65I he was appointed Master of Cromwell’s Northern Uni­
versity at Durham. Hunton®s sympathy for a limited monarchy 
was illustrated in his work, A Treatise of Monarchy, pub­
lished in 1643o Dictionary of~National Biography„ Vol. X, 
312-333 o
^Bowle, op. cit., 189. John Bramhall, Archbishop 
of A rmagh, was born in 1594 and died in I6 6 3. He received 
his education from Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, from 
which he received four degrees, the highest being a Doctor 
of Divinity. His thesis was strongly anti-papal. During 
the Civil War he supported the royalist cause. Dictionary
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Secondlys contends Bowie, all are adverse to Hobbes’s 
cynical and deterministic view of human nature0 They refuse 
to regard man as a cog in a mechanistic universe„ Sir Robert 
Filmer asserts that Hobbes’s state of nature could never have
occurred among the ’’descendants of •Adam/’ for ”God was no
1such niggard at the creation0” Bramhall contends that the 
Hobbesian man was non-existent<, for "there was never such 
degenerate rabble in the world that were without all religions 
all government, all laws* natural and civile” The Reverend 
John Eachard is representative of the critics when he main­
tains that human nature is not so "vile" or "raskally" as 
Hobbes supposed it to be„^
Thirdlys these various Englishmen are opposed to the 
Hobbesian allegation that nothing is morally right or wrong 
until the sovereign commands or forbids its and in consequ­
ence there is no standard by which the ruler may himself be 
judgedo Whitehall feels that
of National Biography, Vol„ II9 ed„ Sir Leslie Stephen and 
Sidney Lee* llll-1114o
•^Bowle, op0 cito,, l60 Sir Robert Filmer was born
in 1§03 and died~in 1653 ° He was a royalists an astute
scholarj and a country gentleman of an independent mind„
Filmer favored patriarchal absolutism,, and is perhaps 
best known to posterity for his Patriarcha, a defense 
of monarchy,, which Locke so ably ridiculedo Ibido, 15o
2Ibido, 124o
■^John Eachard, a great wit and humorist, was born 
in 1636 and died in lo97« In 1675 he became Master of St»
Catherine’s Hall at Cambridges and in 1679 vice-chancellor
of the University,, Eachard possessed a great knack for col­
loquial satirej as is shown in his books Mr„ Hobbes’s State
15
if all religion and morality have no 
sanction but fear and the ruler's command, 
the ’vilest Indian superstitions’ rank 
with civilized religion. But just as the 
scripture would have been valid without 
the Churchj so natural law is independent- 
of institutions
Clarendon contends that the killing of innocent subjects
by Hobbes’s sovereign* which he has a moral right to do,,
would violate natural law and injure God. As Bowie avers*
”all were provoked to assert the moral basis of society* its
pultimate authority over and distinction from government
Lastly,, the critics agree unanimously that Hobbes’s 
system of government is impractical. ’’Hobbes declares 
Bramhallj ’’labours under a hopeless disadvantage; he has 
no idea of practical polities.”3 Clarendon perhaps epito­
mizes the views of the critics when he states;
It is a very hard matter for an archi= , 
tect in state and policy* who doth despise 
all precedent* and will not observe any 
rules of practice* to make such a model of 
government as will be in any degree pleas­
ant to the governor or the ̂ governed* or 
secure for either..^ V
Bowie’s personal interpretation of Hobbes’s pol­
itical doctrine will suffice for a summary of the above
of Nature Considered in a Dialogue between Philautus and 
Timothyo Dictionary of National Biography. Vol. VI* 302=303»
Bowie9 op. cit. . 1780
2Ibid., 199.
^Ibid.9 200.
^Ibido
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views, for their opinions are mirrored in his thoughts.
This Oxford scholar believes that Hobbes attempted to pro*- 
vide a materialistics egotistical underpinning for a new 
political theory. based on the supposition that the conduct 
of men can be determined by observation of their reflex 
actions in a mechanistic world,, The goal of the Hobbesian 
state is the promotion of individual felicity,, which arises 
out of greed and egoismc The state must be an authorita­
rian conciliator of selfish interestss for only when life 
is ordered can individual felicity in any degree by ob­
tained. In regard to Hobbesfs religious viewss Bowie feels 
that if Hobbes was not an atheistP he was at the least an 
agnostic. Bowie8s feelings about Hobbes are summarized 
very adroitly in the following statement;
He is the prophet of a cynieal8 deter­
ministic and utilitarian political theory8 
which discards the old sanctions?of natural 
reason reflecting a Divine order9 and which 
replaces it with the imposition of arbitrary 
power as the price of security. He repudi­
ates the alternative--the standard by which 
governments as distinct from society, is to 
be judged. He attempts to destroy the con­
cepts both of a constitutional frame of 
society superior to executive government 
and of a cosmic order superior to man-made 
institutions...and by advocating the subor­
dination of religion to political authority,, 
and his dislike of corporations within the 
commonwealthj he paved the way for modern 
utilitarianism,, concepts of positive law, ' . 1 
and concentrated state power.^
The outlines of the standard interpretation having
-klbid.. 560
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been drawn by Hobbes’s contemporaries, it is now necessary 
to discuss the various writers who have filled in and aug­
mented the above sketcho Sir Leslie Stephen is perhaps
characteristic of these writers.,^ His book, published in
21904, is still widely cited by contemporary scholars„ 
Stephen divides his work into two main parts; a biography 
of Hobbes; and a discussion of Hobbes’s view of.the world, 
man, and the state„ However, since this paper is concerned 
primarily with Hobbes’s political philosophy, Stephen’s 
treatment of this matter will be more heavily emphasizedo 
Before Stephen’s exposition of the Hobbesian state 
is discussed, however, it is necessary to comment briefly
^Sir Leslie Stephen, a man of letters and a phil­
osopher, was born in l#32o His higher education consisted 
of a short attendance at Kings College, and four years at 
Trinity Hall at Michaelmas, Cambridge„ From Cambridge he 
received a Goodbehere Fellowship,, In IG56 he obtained a 
junior tutorship at Trinity Hall, and three years later he 
took religious orders„ However, after reading Mill, Comte, 
and Kant, he rejected the historical evidences of Christi­
anity o Thus he was forced to resign his tutorship, which 
was contingent upon his being a priest„ At the end of IG64 
Stephen left Cambridge for London in order to embark on a 
literary career., Early in IS65 he relinquished his relig­
ious orders0
For the remainder of his life Stephen pursued a ' 
career of writing and working as an editor of various/ maga­
zines o Religious and philosophical speculations also held 
his interest, however, and in IS76 he composed a two volume 
History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century„ Six 
years later he produced his Science of Ethics, in which he 
summed up his views of the fundamental problems of life’,', 
in light of his study of Mill, Darwin, and Spencer0 During 
the- same year he also assumed the editorship of the Dic­
tionary of National Biography, a position he was to hold 
for nine years„ In 1904 Stephen died* Dictionary of Nat­
ional Biography, 2nd Supple, Vole III, edc Sidney Lee, 39#“ 
405 e
^Sir Leslie Stephen, Hobbes(’’English Men of Letters”; 
New York; The Macmillan Co0,*190477
on his interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophical system. Thi 
Cambridge alumnus feels that Hobbes was attempting to corn? 
struct a complete system in which the method of the physical 
sciences would be coordinated with a theory of the civil 
state, i.e., Hobbes wanted to expound a mechanical theory of 
the universe where every phenomenon would be explained as 
the effect of known causes, and where motion and matter are 
the two universal actualities, by which even man may be ex­
plained. Stephen, in describing the Hobbesian man, declares 
’’man is an automation; thought is a motion in his brain; and 
all his actions can be explained by the laws of motion, like 
the motions of a clock.”-1- His perceptions, calculations, 
and motives are movements in his brain, caused by the im- 
pact of external bodies on the organs of the senses. Here 
one finds a mechanistic explanation of physiological enti-j 
ties. Stephen notes a break in the continuity of method 
when Hobbes discusses human nature, for he contends, that 
although Hobbes still attempts to use his theory of motion, 
he.is forced to rely on empirical psychology. However, as 
this particular topic is not of great importance to this 
thesis, it will suffice at this time to explain Stephen’s 
elaboration of the social characteristics of the Hobbesian 
man.
■'■Ibid., &ko
2Ibid., 104o
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Stephen’s opinion of the Hob'besian man can best be 
illustrated by his description of the Hobbesian state of 
nature,, In this condition all men possess two characteris­
tics in common; they are naturally equal; and all seek pow­
er over otherso The results of this equality and desire 
for power are obvious; there will be war by all against alio 
Stephen deviates somewhat from the opinion of Hobbes’s con­
temporaries when he states that Hobbes did not imply that 
men are evil by nature, ’’The desires are not themselves 
wicked,” Stephen states, ’’although at times they may cause 
wicked actions0”^ The Cambridge scholar advances this con­
tention a step further when he asserts;
A modern world would maintain, like 
Hobbes, that in admitting the part played 
by selfish force in the development of so-, 
ciety, he does not assert the wickedness 
of human nature. He only asserts that the 
good impulses cannot acquire the desirable 
supremacy until a peaceful order has been 
established by the complex struggles and 
alliances of human beings, swayed by all 
their passions and ambitions
Men get out of this degenerate state by using their 
reason to discover the laws of nature. The laws of nature, 
however, Stephen believes, are not properly laws but rather 
theorems of what are conducive to self-preservation, ’’The 
Law of Nature, we see, is simply an application of the pure­
ly egotistic law of self-preservation,,”  ̂ These theorems be-
1Ibido» l$5o 
2Ibid„0 186. 
3lbid.„ 189.
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come laws as binding commands when they are delivered in 
the word of God. They are always binding in foro interno; 
you are always bound to desire that they should came:' into 
operation, because they are conducive to self-preservation, 
•They are not always binding in foro externo, however; you 
are not obliged to put them into practice, for to do so in 
the state of nature would be a hindrance to individual 
self-preservation,
Stephen asserts that Hobbes realized
that the development of morality 
implies the growth of a certain under­
standing between the individuals com­
posing the society, and that until this 
has been reached ideal morality proper 
to a higher plane of thought is imprac­
ticable if not undesirable,1
• Apparently, Stephen is suggesting the absence of 
any type of morality outside of political society. As for 
the question of morality in civil society, Stephen is in 
essential agreement with Bowie that government creates moral 
values, Stephen believes that Hobbes identifies law and 
morality. He himself feels that the actual morality of a 
race is evolved in constant correlation with its social 
organization.2 Stephen avers,
Hobbes, who substituted the social 
contract for this process, and regarded 
sovereignty as the sole bond of union, 
could only approximate to this, doctrine
4 M cL , 191.
2Ibid,. 216,
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by making moral obligations a product of 
the sovereign will.l
But Hobbes contends that the sovereign creates morality by
making honesty and gratitude, which are precepts of the law
of nature tending toward self-preservation, obligatory,.
But the problem arises, what if the sovereign makes immoral
laws? At this point Stephen begs this question by saying
that the sovereign cannot commit injustice or injury in the
proper signification,. The subject has no right to protest
or disobey because of the immorality of the sovereign, the
reason being that the only alternative is anarchy. Bad
laws are better than no laws.2 So ultimately Stephen is
put in the position of saying that the sovereign can make
any law that he desires, so long as he maintains order.
As stated above, Stephen regards Hobbes’s laws of
nature as theorems conducive to self-preservation. But
every man has a possible right to everything in the state
of nature, by virtue of the fact that this is necessary
for his individual felicity and self-preservation. It is
evident that in a situation of this type no man’s life or
happiness is s e c u r e T h e r e f o r e  the fundamental theorem
of nature is that every man should seek peace and then
maintain it, for peace nullifies the necessity for'self-
llbid.
2Ibid.. 217c
3Ibid.. 187.
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defense. Consequently, a man should lay down his right to 
all things if others will do the same. At this point Stephen 
elaborates Hobbes’s definition of obligation, duty and jus­
tice:
A man may simply renounce or he may 
transfer a right. In either case, he is 
said to be ’obliged’ not to interfere 
with the exercise of a right by those to 
whom he has abandoned or granted it. It 
is his ’duty’ not to make his grant void 
by hindering men from using the right; 
and such hindrance is called ’injustice.’1
Stephen asserts that obligation in the Hobbesian 
sense is obedience to the terms of a contract, whether it 
is implicit or explicit. Carrying this definition into 
the civil state, one can discern that the Hobbesian man 
must obey his sovereign because he has contracted to do 
so. The violation of the contract on the part of the sub­
ject would create a breach of duty or injustice. He pre­
sumably has the right to breach the contract only if the 
sovereign can no longer provide security, or in some way 
endangers his physical being. The subject is obliged to
ftobey the law because he has contracted with his fellow sub­
jects to do so, i.e., he and his fellow subjects have au­
thorized the sovereign to legislate for them.
The final part of Stephen’s interpretation which/ '
will be considered is th&t dealing with the relationship
, f t
between church and state. Stephen declares that Hobbes’s
*
essential position is quite simple. ( Since actions often
3-1 bid., 187.
stem from opinions, these opinions must be directed in or­
der for actions to be controlled.1 Consequently the sover- 
eign is bound to forbid the utterance or propagation of 
opinions be which his authority may be subverted, regardless 
of whether these opinions are uttered by a priest or a cit­
izen. But a more crucial question is involved here, for 
the presence of an independent ecclesiastical authority 
would split the sovereignty. For- Hobbes, then,- the church, 
as a law-making or governing body, must be fused with the 
state.2 When discussing Hobbes’s atheism, Stephen advances 
the following argument?
Hobbes declares that the only proof of....
God’s existence is the creation of the world, 
and that we cannot possibly know whether the 
world was or was not created. In any case, 
as we have seen, Hobbes always asserts most 
emphatically that we really know nothing of 
God’s attributes, except his existence.-?
Stephen concludes by saying that it is sufficient to re­
mark that Hobbes’s system would be more lucid if he sim­
ply omitted any reference to theology.^
The next savant to be'considered is H. R. Trevor- 
Roper, a professor of modern history at Oxford.  ̂ Trevor-
. . . . . . . . . —  -  - . . . . . . . . . .  ■ - i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1Ibid., 220.
2Ibid., 223.
3lbid.. 151.
^Ibid.. 152.
5h. R. Trevor-Roper, "Fear as the Basis of Hobbes’s 
Political Philosophy,” New Statesman and Nation, XXX(1945)s,
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Roper’s main thesis is that the basis of Hobbes’s political 
philosophy is fear, that is, fear as related to the funda­
mental law of self-preservation. This Oxford professor al­
leges that the Hobbesian man is ”by nature unpolitical and 
irrational, a mechanical creature moved by strings and 
springs, and driven by fear and emotions derived from fear.’’̂  
Man never moves toward positive ends except away from fear. 
Trevor-Roper contends that Hobbes believes there are two 
answers to this basic problem of mankind. One is religion 
that exploits the fear of the unknown. Hobbes, however, 
considered religion not as a safeguard against fear, but 
rather as a parasite on it. At this point Trevor-Roper 
clings to the views of Hobbes’s contemporary censurers when 
he asserts that Hobbes was a complete atheist, ’’regarding 
all religion as a deliberate fraud invented by the priests 
to fool the p e o p l e . T h e  other solution to the problem 
is the Hobbesian civil state. Trevor-Roper interprets 
Hobbes as saying that man, to escape the consequences of 
his bestial, yet timid nature, must erect a civil authority
6l. Hugh Redwall Trevor-Roper, born in 1914, is currently 
a Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford. He obtain­
ed his higher education from Charterhouse and Christ Church, 
Oxford, from which he graduated with first class honors. In 
1934 he became a Craven Scholar, and from 1937 to 1939 he 
was a Research Fellow at Merton College. Seven years later 
he was appointed a Student of Christ Church, Oxford. He 
has written several books, including, Archbishop Laud and 
The Gentry; 1540-1640. Who’s Who, 1959, 3065. '
^Trevor-Roper, op. cit., 6l.
2Ibid.
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of terrifying completeness;
a state based upon naked, and wielding 
power; whose effectiveness alone- is his leg­
itimacy, whose opinions are truth; whose or­
ders are justice, resistence to which is a 
logical absurdity,!
This particular author summarizes very adroitly when he
maintains the Leviathan was written with its axiom: fear;
its method: logic; and its conslusion: despotism,2 As
the reader will easily perceive, the position of Trevor-
•j*
Roper is quite similar to Bowlejs interpretation of Hobbes, 
It is unusual to find the interpretation of two men so a- 
like.
The next interpretation is that of'John Plamenatz.^ 
Plamenatz devotes a short section of his book, The English 
Utilitarians, to Hobbes, and although his interpretation 
does not coincide precisely with the others in this tra­
dition, it has sufficient similarity to be classified in 
this same category,^ This expositor contends that Hobbes 
had very little respect for the past and its traditions, 
for he discarded both of the prevalent European moral the­
ories, of his time. One of these theories asserted that the 
supreme object of human endeavor was; the full and harmonious
V  . . .
^Ibid,
^Ibid,
•̂ At present Mr, Plamenatz is an instructor at Nuf­
field College, Oxford,
^■John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians(2nd Ed,;: 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).
development of all powers of the individual; while the other 
contended that virtue consists of behavior in accord with 
rules that man can discern by the use of his reason. Ac­
cording to Hobbes’s system no man can be better or worse
than he was before; he can only be more or less successful 
in acquiring felicity. The laws of morality, according to
Hobbes, are merely rules which men would do well to obey
2if they wish to be happy. These rules are only dictates 
for attaining felicity, and as such they are not morally 
binding upon anyone. Plamenatz asserts that
the state is no more than a contrivance
to insure that all men do obey these rules,
so that it may be in the interest of each of
them to do so. For a man who obeys them, - ~
while others do not, is no better than a fool.
Hobbes denies that virtue, which is obedience to moral
laws, has a value for men independent of its power to
promote their happiness. The state, then, is a means of
reconciling the selfish interests of men. It exists in
order that the individual may have greater felicity, and
not to protect his natural rights. At this point Plamenatz
defines natural rights in the Hobbesian sense, by asserting
that a right in the state of nature is an unlimited power
to acquire whatever a person desires, providing that he
1I M d . , 11,
2Ibid.
^Ibidl
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has sufficient strength* For Hobbes, rights are merely pow­
er, but he treats them as if they were what others mean by 
natural rights* Here Plamenatz veers from the other scho­
lars of the traditional approach when he contends that Hob­
bes’s transfer of right from the subject to the sovereign 
is alien to the main body of his doctrine. He feels this 
is not compatible with Hobbes’s premises in which the sov­
ereign can do no wrong, for
if a subject finds it in his interest 
to obey the laws, while the sovereign can 
often afford, when it suits his purpose, to 
ignore them, this is only because the sub­
ject has little power and the sovereign a 
great deal.^
No covenant can create obligations in the parties to it, 
for all a covenant can do is alter the circumstances in 
which men act. The Hobbesian state is a system in which 
it is the selfish interest of every man to oblige every 
other man to behave in a way that suits his neighbors. 
Hobbes's social contract does not impose real obligations 
on the partners to it, for
his purpose is not to explain why and to 
what extent subjects are obliged to obey their 
rulers, but only to prove that it is, in all 
but the most rare occasions, in their interest 
to do so.
On examining the above interpretation, one can see 
that Mr. Plamenatz agrees essentially with the other inter-
1Ibid., 13. 
2Ibid., 14.
pretations on the question of morality in the Hobbesian 
state. He differs somewhat on the question of obligation, 
but nevertheless he is still close to the traditional in­
terpretation, because he bases obligations on self-interest, 
which is implicit in the orthodox interpretation.
The most recent work, chronologically, in the
vein of the traditional interpretation is a short survey
of the political philosophy of Hobbes written by T. E.
Jessop for the British Council and Book L e a g u e J e s s o p ,
a student of Hume, is a Ferens Professor of Philosophy at
2the University of Hull. Regardless of his specialty, 
however, he has surveyed Hobbes rather well. Jessop as­
serts that Hobbes drew the conclusion from the.miseries of 
the civil wars that the dominating function of the state 
is to secure peace, and the only possible way to carry 
out this function is to have a government possessed of
3plenary powers over all spheres, religious and civil alike. 
The, theoretical.problem is set when Hobbes describes, man
^T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes. No. 130( "Writers and 
their Work"; Londons.Longmans, Green, i960).
OThomas Edmund Jessop, a distinguished scholar, was 
born in 1$96. He was educated at Heckmondwike School, Leeds 
University, and Oriel College, Oxford. Since I92S he has 
been the Ferens Professor of Philosophy in the University of 
Hull. He has worked on the editorial board of the World 
Methodist Council, and has also been the Chairman of the 
Adult Religious Education sub-committee of the British Coun­
cil of Churches. Jessop is a prolific writer, having com­
posed many books. Several of these books are on Hume. Who's 
Who. 1959, 1603-1604.
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in the state of nature, i.e.,, being outside of a polit­
ically organized society. Here Jessop contends,
every one acts solely for himself, 
dominated hy the passion for self-pres­
ervation, 1..and each, finding everybody 
in these respects like himself, goes be­
yond a merely passive to an active safe­
guarding of what he has and gets - de­
fense by antifipatory aggression.I
Jessop maintains Hobbes’s view of human nature is only a 
hypothesis, the main support of which is his general psy­
chology. An egotistic view of human nature, then, is the 
initial postualte of this psychology and not the argued 
conclusion. In any event Hobbes’s premises oblige him to 
seek the cause and justification of the civil state in man’ 
very selfishness. Intelligence and raw passion lead men 
to seek peace and follow it. Man is convinced by his 
reason that peace- is more conducive to individual feli­
city;.fear of violent death forces man to believe that life 
will be longer in ordered society. The result of this rea­
soning is a social contract which will be self-enforcing. 
Men transfer their rights to a sovereign and, in doing so, 
they become completely subject to him. Jessop feels that 
the Hobbesian social contract was not intended to be an ex­
planation of the historical origins of government, but rath 
er it was used for logical purposes, i.e., Hobbes was ex­
amining the notion of sovereignty as the one essential
- i  i - -  . -  - - -    —
■^Ibid., 19.
2Ibid.
facet of political philosophy. One must remember that 
Hobbes was a logician, par excellence. The art of defining 
and deducing was Hobbes's profession. Despotism, however, 
is a very old phenomenon, and so Hobbes's major contribution 
to political theory was his juridically applicable con­
ception of the nature of civil laws, i.e., Hobbes asserts 
that. .
a law is nothing more or less than the <;r 
command of the sovereign, and is binding in 
virtue of its origin, not its content.1
The practical implications of this theory, contends Jessop,
are frightful, for all external actions and institutions are
oin every respect under the jurisdiction of the sovereign, 
Hobbes reasons that if the sovereign does not have absolute 
power there will be anarchy. A price must be paid for or­
der.
When discussing the question of morality in the 
Hobbesian state, Jessop departs somewhat from the standard 
interpretation. He feels that Hobbes's sovereign is .bound 
by both God and his conscience to be responsible for his 
subjects. '..The author contends, however, that this refer­
ence to ethics and morality is not inconsistent with Hobbes's 
earlier views, for the Hobbesian man in a state of nature 
had discovered by reqson the various rules of conduct that 
one should follow. Jessop believes that Hobbes's man is
1Ibid., 22.
2Ibid,
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moral in the sense that, "quite independently of political 
discipline, he is aware of moral distinctions and impera­
tives."^ Apparently Jessop feels that the Hobbesian laws 
of nature are in some way moral axioms. He further expands 
this argument by saying that the laws of nature come from 
the author of nature, who is undoubtedly God. Consequent­
ly these are laws for all eternity, binding on man as such, 
and therefore on rulers and subjects alike. Jessop ends 
his survey by asserting that Hobbes’s ethic includes ob­
jective moral laws which are perpetually valid and divine 
in origin but which only become operative in a civil state. 
As for Hobbes’s religious beliefs, Jessop maintains that 
if Hobbes was an atheist, he was hypocritical;- but on the 
other hand, he was a deist only if his reference to revel­
ation was also hypocritical. This philosophy professor 
summarizes his survey with the following statements
...Hobbes.is adamant in proclaiming 
peace as the paramount external condition 
of a really human life, and strong govern­
ment as the only means of securing it; and 
believes that morality and religion are 
demands of man’s original nature, one of 
his problems being how to reconcile their 
inner automony with the necessity of com­
prehensive political control.3
No-discussion of the>.traditional interpretation
would be complete without reference to the various text-
1Ibid., 25.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.. 27.
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book writersj for they, above everyone else, are responsible 
for the propagation of this interpretation today. Perhaps 
the most satisfactory manner of discussing these writers 
would be to choose an author representative of their thoug­
hts. For this purpose William Ebenstein is perhaps the 
best choice, for he is illustrative of the text-book writ- 
ers.^ . Ebensteints interpretation of the Hobbesian state of 
nature epitomizes the accepted view of what is correct. He
contends that the Hobbesian men ”are naturally equal in mind 
2and body.” Furthermore, this basic equality of men. is the 
principal source of trouble and misery, i.e., if two men 
seek an object, they naturally become antagonistic and seek 
to destroy each other.3 This professor also believes that 
the Hobbesian social contract is for philosophical rather 
than historical purposes. The fear of death is the passion 
that moves men toward peace, for once man realizes that his 
fear of violent death is due primarily to brutal competition, 
he will seek a system where this competition-will be elim-
-Nfilliam Ebenstein, Introduction to Political Phil- 
osophy(New York; Rhinehart and Co., 1952). Austrian-born, 
William,Ebenstein is currently a professor of political 
science at Princeton University. He is well educated, hav­
ing received a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University 
of Vienna, and a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of 
Wisconsin. He has written several books including Fascist 
Italy, Great Political Thinkers, and Modern Political Thoug- 
ht. Wh.oT s Who in America, Vol. XXXII(Chicago; A. N. Marquis
Co., 1962-1963), $37.
pEbenstein, op. cit., 12J+.
3Ibid.
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inated to a degree, Ebenstein concludes his discussion of 
Hobbes’s social contract by asserting that it is unlike any 
other social contract theory that preceded it, for it is 
between the subjects themselves, the sovereign having no 
part in it. Endorsing the official interpretation, he con­
cludes that since the sovereign power is "incommunicable 
and inseparable,” every corporation, including the churches, 
must be subordinated 'to the state.^ The state must de­
termine the doctrine of the church if the church is not to 
interfere with the basic function of the state, which is. 
the preservation of order. In regard to the question of 
Hobbes’s religious beliefs, Ebenstein believes that he had 
none. Apparently he considers Hobbes to have been an 
atheist,
Considering the above views in the aggregate, one 
can discern the traditional interpretation of Hobbes’s 
political philosophy. The majority of the writers feel 
that the Hobbesiah man is an egotistical creature who, 
outside of political society, will be in a oons.tant: and 
ruthless state of competition with his fellows. Secondly, 
they believe that the Hobbesian laws of nature are theo­
rems that are conducive to self-preservation, i.e, they
©are not -natural laws in the traditional sense. These 
theorems prescribe peace as a condition essential to indi­
vidual self-preservation and felicity. Men, then, are
ilbid,, 126
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obliged to obey the social contract that they make because 
it is conducive to their self-preservation to do so*. And 
once the sovereign has been established he will require 
his subjects to obey the covenant. Also, a majority of 
the subjects will feel that it is to their advantage to 
carry out the contract and allow their sovereign to pun-, 
ish any violators. In nearly all of,the circumstances the 
violators would be in the minority. Once in power the sov­
ereign authority is complete; he can suppress any opinion 
and subordinate any corporation which he feels is sub­
versive to the state. The church will be fused with /the 
state for a dual reason: firstly, the sovereign will be 
the authoritative interpreter of the scriptures; and sec­
ondly, by being head of the church, the sovereign will be 
in a better position to promote order and security. In 
regard to the question of Hobbes’s religious beliefs, most 
of the writers believe that if Hobbes was not an atheist,
he was skirting the fringes of this position.
There is some disagreement among the writers con­
cerning morality in the civil state, but the majority 
faould ultimately conclude that in the Hobbesian state mo­
rality is merely the sovereign fiat. Instead of having a
set of moral standards determined by the interrelationships 
of the various members of the community, there would be a 
situation where the sovereign would force his will upon 
his subjects, and in doing so would term his will moral.
35
If the primary goal of the state is security, a situation 
of this type could presumably exist, for the subjects would 
feel that even a bad law is better than no law at all*
The traditional interpretation, as the reader has 
undoubtedly noted, has at times ignored or generalized cer­
tain facets of Hobbes’s political theory for the purpose of 
maintaining consistency* It is for perhaps this reason 
that contemporary scholars have begun to re-examine Hobbes’s 
political philosophy* The results of these re-examinations, 
however, have often been drastic changes in the basic 
structure of the ’’official” interpretation*
^’’Official” is a term employed by Howard Warrender 
to describe the traditional interpretation* Howard Warrender, 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 
1957).
CHAPTER II
THE NEW INTERPRETATIONS
The new interpretations of Hobbes’s political phil­
osophy are, for the most part, the results of meticulous exam­
inations of Hobbes’s basic works* This particular method of 
research perhaps manifests the desire on the part of the au­
thors to illuminate certain tenets of Hobbes’s theory that 
the traditional interpretation has tended to ignore* Thus 
these scholars endeavor to resolve the inherent difficulties 
in Hobbes's writings that consistently puzzle students of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy. The attempts to clarify the 
traditional interpretation have, however, changed the very 
basis, of that interpretation. The traditionalists have no 
objections to having their interpretation clarified, but 
they cannot allow their very position to be subverted. This 
chapter, however, will be devoted only to an examination of 
the,new interpretations. The disputations among the various 
schools of interpretationrwill be considered in the next 
chapter.
The first major departure from the standard inter­
pretation occurred in 1936 when Leo Strauss published The 
Political Philosophy of Hobbes.'*' Strauss, a noted German
^Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, trans. 
Elsa Mo Sinclair(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952)o
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scholar of the Hegelian school, was drawn to Hobbes after a
study of Spinoza because the latter had virtually adopted the
1moral and political philosophy of Hobbes. Strauss employs 
the genetic method, i.e., a thorough examination and point- 
by-point comparison of all Hobbes's writings, from the earli­
est to the last. The results of this particular method of 
research are some unusual conclusions concerning the origin 
and growth of Hobbes’s political philosophya According to 
Strauss, the Leviathan must be interpreted in the light of 
these conclusions.
The basis of Hobbes’s political philosophy, con­
tends Strauss, lies somewhere between the naturalistic and 
idealistic philosophical traditions. By starting with 
’’right,” and denying the primacy of law, Hobbes deviates 
from the idealistic tradition^ and on the other hand, by 
employing ’’right,” and not natural inclinations and appe­
tites as the basis of morals and politics, Hobbes does not 
confbrm to the naturalistic tradition. Hobbes finally per­
ceives the incompatibility between natural right and natu­
ral appetite. Consequently, it is Hobbes’s view of funda,-
IStrauss uses Hegel’s philosophy touarrive at dif­
ferent conclusions. Leo Strauss, currently a professor of 
political philosophy at the University of Chicago,, was born 
in Germany in 1&90. He received his Doctor of Philosophy 
degree in 1921 from Hamburg University. A few years later 
he emigrated and in 1944 became a naturalized American cit­
izen. Strauss is perhaps best-known to his contemporaries 
for his radical innovations in the field of political the­
ory and his vigorous opposition to the behavioral sciences. 
Strauss has published several books including On Tyranny. 
Natural Right and History, and Thoughts on Machiavelli.
Who’s Who in America. Vol. X X X I , 1960-1961, 3036. ~
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mental human behavior, and not seventeenth-century science, 
that is the basis of Hobbes ’s political philosophy. Sci­
ence, when utilized at all, is only a method. His political 
philosophy demands an applicable morality, based upon an 
analysis of human passion, and compatible with human will* 
For Hobbes, this morality emanates from the action of hu­
man wills upon each other, and not from a superhuman au­
thority imposing obligations from above.
Morality is established on that passion,, the fear 
of violent death, that compels men to adopt and maintain a 
rational system of conduct in order to escape the blind ir­
rational desires of their own nature. Men are naturally 
divided by mutual fear, and their relations are determined 
by those claims which they can compel their fellow men to 
acknowledge. The indispensible element of Hobbes’s sys­
tem, asserts Strauss, is a moral and humanistic antithesis 
between fundamentally unjust vanity and fundamentally just 
fear of violent death.
According to Strauss, there are two central postu­
lates of human nature in Hobbes’s theory. The first of 
these is vanity, i . etbe..plea sure ttiilch a man derives 
from the consideration of his own real or imaginary power. 
Vanity is the basis of the natural appetite of the Hob­
besian man. Consequently, man’s natural appetite is no­
thing but a striving for precedence over others, and for 
a recognition of this precedence. The passions are the
particular ways of striving after this recognition,, Strauss 
offers several proofs for this assentation. One of these is 
the war of everyone against everyone cast in terms of vanity 
Thus the causes of this war lie in the desire of each man to 
surpass every other<, Another proof offered consists of a 
paragraph taken from the Leviathan, where Hobbes makes refer 
ence to the great Leviathan as being "King of the Proud 
The second main postulate, according to Strauss, is that of 
natural reason, which Hobbes reduces to the principle of 
self-preservation; that is, "since the preservation of life 
is the condition sine qua non for the satisfaction of any 
appetite, it is ?the primary good’,," On the other hand, 
death is the primary evil, having its affirmation in pas­
sion —  the passion of fear of death,, Since the fear of 
death forces man to believe that life is the primary good, 
it/ is the absolute standard of reference by which a man can 
order his life. Only through the knowledge of death can 
man have an aim in life -- avoiding death. Strauss statest
This fear of a violent death, pre- 
rational in origin, but rational in ef­
fect, and the rational principle of self- 
preservation, is, according to Hobbes, 
the root of all right and therewith of : 
all morality.3
The result is, then, that Hobbes denies moral value to all
^Strauss, op. cit.„ 13.
2Ibid.. 15.
3Ibid,. 17.
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virtues which do not proceed from the fear of violent death.
This basic antithesis of Hobbes’s theory is between
vanity as the root of natural appetite, and the fear of vio-
1lent death as the passion which brings men to reason. By 
virtue of his nature, the Hobbesian man lives in a dream of 
the happiness of approaching triumph. So deep i s his dream 
that only a forcible and imposing power will awaken him 
this power is death. The ideal condition for self-know­
ledge by the Hobbesian man is mortal danger. Here, then, 
lies the connecting link between the two postulates of hu- 
man nature. Vanity, taken by itself, leads to mortal con­
flict, by virtue of the fact that although man first lives 
in a world of imagination, he must enter the real world to 
discern if others feel about him the way he feels about 
himself. His claim to superiority is either recognized by 
others or it is not; in either ease there arises a feeling 
of contempt on one side. The man who is slighted will seek 
revenge, with the result that physical combat will ensue. 
Somewhere in the course of this mortal conflict the will to 
triumph of the person seeking revenge is moderated by a 
fear for his personal safety. It is here in this life and 
death struggle that the futility of vanity is exposed. Al­
so at this point the concept of the artificial state arises,
1Ibid., IS.
2Ibid., 22.
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for when both combatants become seized with fear for their 
lives, they overcome their vanity and the shame of confes­
sing their timorousness and,
recognize as their real enemy not the 
rival, but that terrible enemy of nature, 
death, who, as their common enemy, forces 
them to mutual understanding, trust and 
union, and fear procures.them the possibil- , 
ity of completing the founding of the State 
for the purpose of providing safeguards for 
the longest possible term, against the eom- 
- mon enemy„1
The origin of the state in mutual fear also has moral sig- 
nigicance in Hobbes’s political philosophy„
Strauss contends that Hobbes is cognizant of the 
distinction between legality and morality, because the 
Hobbesian maniis just according to the morality of the pur-
ppose and not the legality of the action,. This German 
scholar.asserts that Hobbes, "in believing that the moral 
attitude, conscience, intention, is of more importance than 
the action, -- is at one with Kant as with the Christian 
tradition,"3 Hobbes deviates from this tradition only 
by his denial of the possibility that just and unjust actions 
may be established apart from human legislation„ Strauss 
goes so far as to assert that just and unjust intentions 
are possible in the state of nature, for not every in-
1ibid.
^ I b i d o , 2 3 o
3Ibid-0
tention is permitted, except that of self-preservation. Un­
just attitudes, therefore, stem from pride, while the just 
intentions arise from the fear of violent death. For Strauss 
maintains:
What man does from fear of death, in 
his consciousness of his weakness at the 
. hands of other men, when he honestly con­
fesses to himself and to others his weak­
ness and his fear of death, unconcerned 
about his honor, this alone is fundamen­
tally just...
Conscience is thus identified with the fear of death,-and 
it is this identification which permits a differentiation 
between justice and injustice. It is the unjust man who 
obeys the laws of the state for fear of punishment, with­
out inner conviction, and the just man who obeys them be- 
cause of inner conviction —  the fear of death.2 In retro­
spect, one may conclude that according to Strauss, Hobbes, 
established his morality on that passion, the fear Of vior 
lent death, which forces men to institute a rational system 
of conduct in order to escape the emulatory and illusory 
tenets of their own nature. Strauss’s conception of Hob-* 
besian morality is thus as radical as his de-emphasis on 
science in the Hobbesian philosophical system.
It would seem that the question of moral and pol­
itical obligation in the philosophy of Hobbes holds a par­
ticular fascination for certain of his students because,
•kfbid.« 25 o
2Ibid.
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commencing in 193&, there have been three major interpre­
tations concerning this facet of his theory. These inter­
pretations are partial rebuttals of the orthodox approach 
which denies the existence of morality in the Hobbesian state 
of nature and asserts that, in his civil state, morality is 
only the fiat of the sovereign authority.
The first of these interpretations is that of A, E.
■ 1 Taylor, a graduate of * New College, Oxford, Taylor advances
the thesis that Hobbes’s ethical doctrine has no logical
connection with his egotistical philosophy, and is a strict
deontology which is curiously suggestive of some of the
characteristic theses of Kant, In an explication of his
analogy between certain facets of Hobbes and Kant, he points
to Hobbes’s distinction between the justice of an act and
3-A, E. Taylor. ’’The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” 
Philosophy, Vol. XIIl(l93&), 406-424, Alfred Edward Taylor, 
a scholar and philosopher, was born in 1669 and died in 1945.
He received his higher education from Kingswood School, Bath, 
and New College, Oxford, where he was elected a scholar and 
later an Honorary Fellow, Except for a short period in the 
military service his career was entirely academic. He be­
gan as a Fellow at Morton College, Oxford and finished as 
a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Edin­
burgh* Taylor divided his study of philosophy into essentially 
three parts. Firstly, he had a conception of the task of 
metaphysical philosophy formed from reading Ernst Mac'h, 
partly from his associates at Manchester and St, Andrews, 
and.partly as a result of a sustained study of Galileo,
Leibniz, and Descartes, Secondly, Taylor’s deep interest 
in the problem of religion drove him to study the medie­
val Schoolmen, Thus he contributed to the development of 
neo-scholasticism. And lastly, he was a profound student of 
Plato and Aristotle, He also mastered Kant’s ethics, how­
ever, During his academic career Taylor received many hon­
orary degrees, including a Doctor of Literature and a Doctor 
of Laws from St. Andrews. Dictionary of National Biography,
6th Suppl., ed. L. G, Legg and E'. T. Williams (Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1959), S64-S6 5.
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the justice of a person. Taylor employs a passage from 
De Cive where Hobbes states,
to be just signifies to be delighted 
in just dealing, to study how to do right- 
ousness, or to endeavor in all things to 
do that which is just; and to be unjust is 
to neglect righteous dealings, or to think 
it is to be measured not according to my 
contract but some present„benefit
This Oxford scholar then contends that this is precisely
Kant's distinction between action done merely in accord
with the law and action done from the law,
with the characteristic difference 
that Hobbes is trying to reduce the law 
from which the virtuous man acts, to the 
single law that a promise once duly made 
must be kept.
In the opinion of this author Hobbes also goes so far as
to anticipate Kant's attempt to reduce all really wrong
willing to the irrational attempt to will both sides of
the contradiction at once, Taylor continues by asserting
that Hobbes's thought is at bottom the same as Kant's, but
Hobbes reduces all injury to the violation of an express
or implied promise and he has not, like Kant, "thought of
the universalizing of a maxim as a criterion of its free-
3dom from c o n t r a d i c t i o n T h e  important point, according 
to Taylor, is that Hobbes agrees with Kant on the "im-
^Taylor, op„ cit»„ 408,
2Ibid.. 409*
3Ibido
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perative” character of the moral law, just as he agrees with 
him in the assertation that it is the law of ’’right reason.”1 
Taylor, in support of his characterization of Hobbes
as a deontologist, asserts that the moral obligation to obey
the natural law exists prior to the sovereign and the civil 
society, for ’’even in the ’state of nature’ the law obliges 
in foro interno, though Hobbes is careful not to add, always
in foro externo.”^ However, the reference to in foro ex-
ter.no is only a playing of words, contends Taylor, to remind 
us that the laws require reciprocal obligations, and that 
when there is no common power to act as protector, a man 
must judge for himself whether his desire for peace is recip­
rocated on the part of other men. Another implication pres­
ent here is that moral law may be violated by an improper 
thought or purpose. One must remember, asserts Taylor, 
that even in the civil state, there is a large area where 
the sovereign has not legislated, and here natural law ob­
liges man to exhibit equity, which is Hobbes’s ’’Golden 
Rule,’’ i.e., do not unto another what you are unwilling to 
have done to yourself.3 All obligations, then, including 
the one to honor your covenant by strict obedience to the 
sovereign, are derived from a natural law. The sovereign
if ■ .
1Ibid., 410o
2Ibid.. 411o
3Ibid.. 412.
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does nothing to create the obligation to keep a covenant,
all he really does is decree that the 
performance of certain covenants is illegal 
and to prescribe the precise forms of dec- 
larations of our intentions which his 
courts will regard as constituting a con­
tract
The duty to obey the civil law arises from the fact that 
the subject has covenanted to be loyal and obey the sov­
ereign, and therefore if he voids the covenant he would 
be violating natural law. Taylor continues by declaring 
that the duty of obeying the civil laws follows as a part 
of a consistent deontology, for natural law is not super­
seded by positive law in the civilized society. Rather 
there is the duty in Hobbes’s society to recognize the 
sovereign’s commands as the rule of life. Even if one 
disapproves of a particular command, he is bound by a
’’prior obligation” to comply with it, for its violation
2would constitute bad faith.
According to Taylor, the deontological character 
of Hobbes’s thought is also brought out in the doctrine 
that the civil sovereign is just as. much under a rigid 
law of moral obligation as are his subjects, for he is 
obligated to equity, the strict observance of natural law, 
The sovereign has the duty of promoting the public good, 
and a duty entails following what is prescribed by law;
•klbid., 413 *
2Ibid., 415.
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and for Hobbes all law is a command of the person whose 
precept contains within it the reason of obedience. Nat 
ural law, then, limits the sovereign because it is the 
command of God. Taylor further states:
To recognize them as laws, we must 
also know that they are the commands of 
God; and since Hobbes teaches us that a 
law which binds in foro interno is not 
really complied with unless there is a 
formal intention to obey it as law, we 
do not really fulfill the demands of eq­
uity unless we obey the divine command 
as such, because it is a divine command.-3-
How does Hobbes know that natural laws are the commands 
of God? Taylor contends that Hobbes is led to this con­
viction not so much by the Scriptural testimonies which 
he produces in such profession, "as by the unusual depth 
of his own sense of moral obligation.” In conclusion, 
Taylor asserts that in Hobbes’s political philosophy 
there is a moral obligation originating in natural.law, 
which is binding on both sovereign and subjects. The 
obligatory force of civil law is derived entirely from 
our obligation to observe natural law. Hobbes’s pol­
itical philosophy, then, is a deontology characterized 
by a consistent moral o-bli gat ion present throughout 
his whole account of man in both the state of nature 
and civil society...
3-1 bid.. 419.
2Ibid.. 422.
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Professor Michael Oakeshott has also interpreted 
Hobbes’s theory of moral and political obligation in a 
radical manner.^ Furthermore, he avowedly challenges all 
previous critics of Hobbes. If one is to believe Oake­
shott, he is the first man in history to understand Hobbes. 
He divides the opponents of Hobbes into two classes, the 
emotional and the intellectual. The first class he dis­
misses lightly, saying their opinions of Hobbes are de­
rived from emotional irrationalism. He considers the 
critics of the second class more important, however, for 
it is through them that Hobbes has influenced the history 
of ideas. According to Oakeshott, these men have shown 
a regrettable tendency to fix their attention on Hobbes’s 
obvious errors, and to lose sight of his philosophy as a 
whole. Moreover, they have failed to detect the tradition 
to which his civil philosophy btlOngs, which has led to
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946). Michael Joseph Oakeshott, 
born in 1901, is currently a professor of political science 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
University of London. He received his higher education from 
St. George’s School, Harpendon; Gonville and Caius College, 
Cambridge; and Nuffield College, Oxford. In his view of 
politics he is a conservative who looks with disfavor upon 
idealogical politics. Furthermore, he accepts tradition, 
and in doing so places an emphasis upon the limitation of 
reason and the importance of practical as against technical 
knowledge in the world of affairs. Oakeshott has written 
several books including, Experience and Its Modes, and Sor; 
cial and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe. Who’s 
Who,. I960, 2251 o Neal Wood”, ”A Guide to the Classics: 
Skepticism of Professor Oakeshott,” Journal of Politics,
XXI(1959), 647-662.
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the misconception that it belongs to none. For Oakeshott, 
then, no writer has suffered more at the hands of little 
men than Hobbes.
Although Oakeshott!s thoughts on the question of 
Hobbes’s moral and political obligation are perhpas the 
most important in his entire interpretation, it is also nec­
essary to discuss other parts of his exegesis. Oakeshott, 
like Strauss, advances the contention that the greatest of 
all hindrances to the acquiring of felicity by the Hobbes- 
ian man is pride. Pride, the desire for superiority, is 
an illusion, and will hinder a man from choosing the best 
route to felicity, even when he is alone. The purging 
emotion for pride is the fear of death, which necessitates 
prudence and thus makes man a civilized creature. What is 
gained by sagacity will be augmented by reason, for it is 
reason that discovers certain truths for the guidance of 
men in their common and collective pursuit of felicity. 
Oakeshott asserts that the Hobbesian man can design his 
own deliverance when ’’inspired by passion (fear of death) 
and instructed by r e a s o n . . . T h e s e  truths are none other 
than the laws of nature. Furthermore,
there is one conclusion which com­
prehends the whole method of reasoning 
in this matter: when there are a number 
of men, felicity is impossible of at­
tainment unless each man acts so as not 
to do to another what- he would-'have* not
^Oakeshott, ed., op. cit.„ xxxvii.
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done to himself*
This is Hobbeses ’’Golden Rule” paraphrased. Peace and se­
curity are the common negative conditions without which fe­
licity is impossible, i.e.,
it is negative because it follows from 
our conception of the character of the in­
dividual and his felicity that one man can
promote the felicity of another only nega­
tively by forbearance, not positively byactivity.2
The second and third laws of nature are additional conclu­
sions of man’s reasoning contingent on the primary prin­
ciple, and there is a supplementary proviso that no man 
can agree to act in any way as to preclude his further pur­
suit of f e l i c i t y T h e  men will covenant, then, in order
to pursue their individual felicity. But one must remem­
ber, avers Oakeshott, that a covenant in this situation 
can never be anything but a state of will, for there can­
not be an executed contract. What each man undertakes is 
to maintain a certain state of will, i.e., "what each man 
undertakes is always doing and never done.”^ The required 
state of will would only be possible from a perpetual main­
tenance of a covenant -- the daily keeping of a promise —  
which can never obtain the fixed and conclusive character
•krbid., xxxvi .
^Ibid., xxxvii.
3Ibid.
•̂Ibid.. xxxviii.
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of a contract performed once and for eternity. The cov- 
enant institutes an office, which is a representative will;, 
and not a common will, of the subjects., It is impossible 
to transfer a common will, asserts Oakeshott. This office 
is distinct from the natural person or persons who hold it„ 
The sovereign authority so instituted has both rights and 
duties. The rights are liberties, i»eo, what it may do;
pwhile the duties are what it must do. The duties are con- 
tingent upon the end for which the sovereign is instituted 
—  success, whereas its rights are gained from transference 
as a consequence of the covenant. At this point Oakeshott 
contends,
but, since what was transferred was the 
natural right of each man to do whatever 
he wills, the rights in the sovereign must 
be those of a natural man. The paradox of 
the civil society is that in it the extent 
of the rights of the artificial man, called 
Sovereign, are determined by nature. And, 
just as the natural right of each man was 
to do what was needful to procure good for 
himself, the artificial right of the sov­
ereign is to do what is needful to procure 
the only good that can be said to be uni­
versally desired -- the benefit of peace.3
The relation of the sovereign authority to the sub­
ject, where one commands and the other obeys, contends Oake­
shott, is not one that excludes liberty, but actually im­
•̂Ibido
2Ibido, xl„
3Ibid.
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plies it; for liberties are rights which arise from the si­
lence of law* The silence of law will brood over large a- 
reas of the subject’s actions, and where there is silence 
there is liberty* Also law as a command implies liberty in 
the person commanded* In the first place, there is a lib­
erty of mental activity; and furthermore, since all com­
mands are generally abstract, the lawmaker assumes that the 
subject has the ability to ’’fill in the detail and trans­
late the generality into an act in which this generality is 
fulfilled*’’-*- Therefore, even though a large proportion of 
the acts of a subject are under the control of a command,
’’there remains inside every act of obedience an area of un-
2assailable liberty*”
Oakeshott again deviates from the orthodox inter­
pretation when he contends that Hobbes’s civil state is a 
Christian commonwealth, i.e., composed of Christian subjects 
under a Christian sovereign* In this Christian commonwealth 
the privilege of each man to interpret scripture and deter­
mine the laws of God by his own reason will be transferred 
to the -sovereign with the rest of his natural right, for 
the liberty to interpret is not a distinct part of each 
man’s general natural right*3 The recipient, the sovereign.
•*-Ibid *, xli.v*: * 
^Ibid*
^Ibido, xlvrii*
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will settle and interpret scripture and thus determine au­
thoritatively the rules that belong to the laws of God and 
nature. There exist laws, however* in a Christian common­
wealth which even the sovereign must obey. These laws are 
from God, creating an obligation for the sovereign. Also, 
the subject, by virtue of the fact that he is a Christian, 
has a corresponding extension of both his obligation and 
his r i g h t T h e  rule of his religion provides a new sanc­
tion for the observance of his obligation. Furthermore,
the articles of peace are for him no 
longer merely the conclusions of reasoning 
legitimately enforced by the sovereign 
power; they are also laws of God, To ob­
serve the covenant he has made with his 
fellow becomes a religious obligation as 
well as a piece of prudential wisdom and 
civil duty.2
The last tenet and perhaps the most controversial 
part of Oakeshott’s interpretation is his elucidation of 
Hobbes’s theory of obligation. Oakeshott, when interpret­
ing Hobbes, distinguishes among four types of obligation; 
physical, rational, moral, and political. Physical obli­
gation arises when a man is prevented, forbidden, or bound, 
by the power of another from performing an action that he 
has willed. This form of obligation involves an external 
impediment to a man’s power, and as such is unrelated to 
his natural right. In addition to this, a man may be pre­
llbid,, xlix,
2Ibid.
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vented from willing a particular action because he perceives 
that its probable consequences are damaging to himself. In 
this type of situation the ’’impediment is internal, a combin- 
ation of rational preception and fear, which is aversion from 
something believed to be hurtful.”! Here again, in ration­
al .obligation, although the power to will an action is im­
peded, no facet of a man’s natural right is limited.
But there is yet another and entirely different type 
of obligation that curtails natural right per se, instead 
of only the power to exercise it. This new type of obli-
2gation is moral, and arises from the effect of authority. 
Authority, according to Oakeshott, is a right which emanates 
from a wills
An authority is a will that has been 
given a Right by a process called author­
ization, which (in turn) is the voluntary 
act of those who are to be morally oblig­
ed or bound by the commands of the author­
ized will. This voluntary act of author­
ization is a surrender (by mutual coven­
ant) of the natural Right of each man, 
which, in a single act, creates and endows 
with authority an artificial Representa­
tive man or body of men who, in respect 
of this endowment, is called Sovereign,
The exercise of the will of the Sovereign 
is called legislation, and moral obli­
gation is the offspring of laws so made.
The sole cause of the moral obligation is 
the will of this Sovereign authority; the 
only sort of action to which the term moral 
obligation is applicable is obedience to
libido j, lix,
2Ibid0
the commands of an authority authorized by 
the voluntary act of him who is bound. .The 
answer to the question, Why am I morally 
bound to obey the will of the Sovereign?
Because I have authorized the Sovereign,
'avouched1 his actions, and am ’bound' by 
my own act.'1
Oakeshott qualifies the above statement by saying 
that the covenant does not itself create moral obligations, 
"it is not itself morally obligatory and not being a law 
(the will of the Sovereign), it does not itself make any 
conduct morally obligatory.”2 There was a rational obli­
gation involved in the making of the covenant, but this in 
no way creates moral obligation. However, the contract 
may become morally obligatory if the sovereign commands its 
obedience. Oakeshott further asserts that moral obligations 
are not based on self-interest, for self-interest is a ra­
tional obligation which cannot bqcome moral until commandedi
by the sovereign. Also, moral obligation is not contingent 
upon the superior power of the sovereign authority, for 
right is never identified with power and "a Sovereign that 
had no Right (that is, no authorization) could only bind 
physically, and not morally.Ultimately, there is no 
other law independent of the sovereign’s will. Consequent­
ly there are no moral obligations independent of this sov­
ereign fiat. Therefore, natural law is not legally binding
-̂Tbid., lx.
2Ibid. 
•̂Ibid., lx.
upon the subjects until the sovereign has willed its dic­
tates o Nor is the word of God as given in the scriptures 
binding, except in the authoritative version; therefore, 
"laws springing from that interpretation are morally obli­
gatory, not because they are God's, but because they are 
the Sovereign’s.”^
Political obligation, according to Oakeshott, is 
a mixture of physical, rational, and moral obligation de-. 
signed to serve one end, but which are never assimilated 
to each other, i.e., ’’civil society is a complex of au­
thority and power in which each element creates its own
2appropriate obligation.” Oakeshott concludes by saying 
that each of these obligations provides a ̂ separate motive 
for. creating the civil state, and each is necessary for 
the preservation of that commonwealth.
The above paragraph concludes the analysis of Oake­
shott’ s interpretation. As the reader has now discerned, 
various tenets of this elucidation are rather arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, to the sorrow of other Hobbesian scholars, 
Oakeshott’s interpretation is very influential, for it is 
contained in the introduction to Blackwell's edition of 
the Leviathan which is widely used in the teaching of. po­
litical theory.
The latest major interpretation of Hobbes’s theory
•̂Ibid. „ lxi.
2Ibid.
57
of obligation is set forth in a book by Howard Warrender, 
entitled The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.1 For the most 
part this book is a detailed exegesis of A. E. Taylor’s ear­
lier article, with the addition of certain new points. The
main thesis of Warrender is set forth in the following para­
graph :
Hobbes says so much about self-preser- 
vatioh that it is easily regarded as being 
central in his theory of obligation. This 
is so far from being the case that it is 
not a part of the theory as such* but an 
empirical postulate employed in its appli­
cation. A denial of Hobbes’s psychology, 
therefore, merely poses a new problem of
application, but leaves his theory of ob­
ligation, in the proper sense, unaffected.^
Warrender contends that in Hobbes’s political phil­
osophy there is a consistent theory of obligation that is 
present throughout his whole account of man, in both the 
state of nature and civil society. Political obligation is 
not a new type of obligation created by the covenant, but 
rather it springs from a moral obligation to obey the laws 
of. nature. Hence the difference between the state of nature 
and civil society is that some of the duties which are sus­
pended in one become operative in the other.
According to Warrender, there are in the state of
nature general obligations to seek peace and to preserve a
^Howard Warrender, The^Political Philosophy of Hobbes 
(Oxford: Clarendon..Press, 1957). Currently Warrender in- 
structs political theory in the Queen’s University at Belfast.
2Warrender, op.’cit.. 93
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readiness of mind to obey the laws of nature. In this sit­
uation, intentions are judged as well as actions. The ob­
ligatoriness of the laws of nature emanates from the fact 
that they are the commands of God. In this case, then, as 
law is the command of one whose precept contains it in the 
reason for obedience, the laws are to be obeyed simply be­
cause they are the laws of God. The laws of nature, how­
ever, will not oblige those who do not accept God as all- 
powerful, i.e., insane persons, children, and atheists. 
Therefore, the state of nature is not by any means one in
which there are no obligations, and "still less it is a
"1state where there are no moral principles.T,J-
Warrender continues by saying that obligation in 
the civil state does not depend in any way upon the social 
contract or upon the command of the civil sovereign. Rath­
er the ground of obligations is always present, for it orig­
inates in the commands of God in His natural Kingdom.. The 
function of the sovereign is to provide the validating con­
dition for the employment of this obligation, "in a system
of .rights and duties that he himself does not create-or 
2control." The validating condition is "sufficient secur­
ity," and so the difference between the state of nature and 
civil society is one -of circumstance and not of moral...prin­
ciples. The sovereign does not provide an obligation to
XIbid.. 102.
2Ibid.. 2S.
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keep valid covenants, rather he makes possible circumstances 
in which there are valid covenants to keep. As Warrender 
contends, the obligation to obey covenants is the third law 
of nature. Laws and covenants are only the instruments of 
obligation and not the source. Perhaps a good summary of 
the above is a paragraph from Warrender’s book:
Providing that certain validating con- . 
ditions are satisfied, men are always bound 
by law, and they may further extend such 
obligation by covenant. The account of 
civil society is essentially an account of 
how these validating conditions may become 
satisfied. The civil sovereign prescribes 
neither the ground of obligations nor the 
terms under which they are valid in any 
particular case, but is concerned entirely 
with the satisfaction of conditions: which, 
he himself does not specify. The resul­
tant pattern of obligations in civil soci­
ety is, therefore, the product under spe­
cial circumstances, of moral principles 
which bind as men, and not simply as cit­
izens.!
As previously stated, Warrenderfs thesis is basically 
that of Taylor’s, with some minor exceptions. In the first 
instance, Warrender does not agree with Taylor’s analysis of 
obligation in the state of nature in terms of reciprocity. 
Warrender contends that this position cannot be justified in 
terms of Hobbes’s text. In the second place, he asserts 
that because Taylor is concerned only with sovereignty by 
institution, he ignores Hobbes’s illustration of sovereignty 
by conquest or acquisition. In the 'last place, Warrender 
will not suscribe to the analogies between the doctrines of
1Ibid.. 102.
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Hobbes and Kant, for Warrender contends that such drawing 
of analogies is misleading,, Any similarities generally turn 
but to be superficial,,
Warrender is undoubtedly an astute scholar, but his 
work suffers because it is written in an atrocious style, 
which .inhibits lucidity. Furthermore, he attempts to at­
tribute a higher degree of consistency to Hobbes’s philos­
ophy than it actually possesses.
Two other interpretations merit consideration before 
this chapter is brought to a close. The first of these is 
set forth in an article ’’Hobbes and Hobbism”,;by S. B.iLamp- 
recht, a professor at Amherst College.^ In his article 
Lamprecht distinguishes between the traditional interpreta^ 
tion and what he terms the correct one.
Lamprecht commences his article by stating that the 
picture of the Hobbesian man in a state of nature is not 
intended by Hobbes to be .a complete view of human nature.
His portrait is of only one aspect of human nature, "an as­
pect which may at times be competently controlled, but can
•̂S. P. Lamprecht, ’’Hobbes and Hobbism,’’ American Po­
litical Science Review. XXXIV{ 1940),, 31-53. Sterling Power 
Lamprecht, born in 1S90, received his higher education from 
four schools: Williams College; Harvard University; Union 
Theological Seminary; and Columbia University. He commenced 
his academic career as an instructor of philosophy at Colum­
bia, and continued there until 192$, when he moved to Amherst 
CQllege, where he has remained ever since. Lamprecht has 
published several books, including Our Religious Tradition, 
Mature and History, and Our Philosophical Traditions. Di­
rectory of American Scholars, 3rd- ed., ed„ Jaques Cattell 
(New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1957), 427.
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never possibly be eradicated.”"*" The concept of man in a 
state of nature, Hobbes regards as a permanent factor with­
in society, a factor with which all sound social authority 
must be constantly occupied. This is an ever-present menace 
against which man must always be on his guard. According to 
this Amherst scholar, then, the concept of man in a state of 
nature is useful in enabling one to estimate the importance 
of the social bonds that determine the conduct of any man 
he might wish to study. At this point Lamprecht makes a 
radical assertion when he states that ’’Hobbes was not so 
poor a psychologist as to overlook man’s genuinely social 
i n t e r e s t H o b b e s  saw that a lucid concept of a man in the 
state of nature is a prerequisite for any formation.of an 
effective technique of social control, since the difficul­
ties of social life are not the results of man’s better as­
pects, but rather of his basic lusts.
Secondly, Lamprecht disagrees with those who main­
tain that, for Hobbes, morality is the product of the ar­
bitrary fiat of the sovereign, and consequently lacks all 
validity apart from the sovereign’s control. Hobbes,• asserts 
Lamprecht, is speaking here in legalistic and not moral
terms where ’’justice and right are being defined in terms of
3enforcement of a conformity to law.”  ̂ This is an analytical
^Lamprecht, op. cit., 41 •
Îbid.
^Ibid., 43 o
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position on Hobbes’s part, for where there is no law, there 
is no question of right or justice. Lamprecht summarizes 
when he states:
Justice then begins only where laws ex­
ist. And in the absence of law, might makes 
right, not in the sense that might proves 
wisdom or virtue to be resident in him who 
exercises the might, but in the sense that 
might, when irresistable, is a beginning of 
a regime in which the distinction between 
the ruler and the subjects is emerging, in 
which, hence, the existence of the law is 
beginning to manifest itself and conformity 
to the law is incipiently required.1
A corollary to this remark, avers Lamprecht, is that 
Hobbes is also insisting .that any significant morality is 
social in character and presupposes the occurrence of reg­
ularized procedures. Morality is not considered when men 
are separate, but only when they are in an integrated con­
dition where the question of social adjustment arises. This 
Amherst professor feels that Hobbes will admit the existence 
of a minor type of morality apart from social institutions, 
but all the significant moral problems stem from the com- 
plex adjustments of men in a civil society. The subject of 
law is also involved here, for it is because justice and 
right have important meanings as legal terms that morality 
can be viewed as a social affair. According to Lamprecht, 
law creates ’’significant moral situations, ;.and Hobbes saw 
this more clearly than any prior political philosopher of
1Ibid.
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modern times." Any absence of law would result in chaos, 
where the possibility of moral achievement would be annul­
led by universal strife;
Hobbes dramatically was stressing the 
point that morality (aside from a few triv­
ial exceptions) arises in social life as 
manifest in the existence of social instru­
mentalities, or institutions to regularize 
human relations, of laws to define and mod-., 
ify these relations, and of authorities to 
enforce their observance.2
In the third place, contends Lamprecht, when Hobbes
states that the law-maker is always morally justified in
all his acts, he means that the source of the law cannot
logically be contrary to the law. Hobbes repudiates the
belief that the king can do no wrong when he asserts that
the sovereign is subject to the laws of nature as well as
the dictates of reason. Above all else the sovereign has
a duty to provide good government, and
not simply may a sovereign violate his 
responsibilities to his people through indul­
gence in vice or through neglect, but even a 
conscientious sovereign may commit such vital 
mistakes of judgment that his rule involves, 
serious moral disaster.3
Lastly, Lamprecht compromises with the traditional­
ists by stating that in the Hobbesian civil state there 
can be no appeal to the law as a protection of popular
rights, since there are no popular rights other than thei
■     - -  -   - ■  ■      - -   *■■ ■ ■    -   -  -7
^Ibid., 45 .
2Ibid., 46.
3Ibid.. 47.
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passing whim of the sovereign. Lamprecht even goes so far 
as to endorse Hobbes in this position. Firstly, he contends, 
since social problems often admit of no settlement by com­
promise, it is necessary to have a sovereign who can act with 
impunity. One of the conditions of civil life is the re­
quirement of obeying governmental decisions, even if they 
seem to have been made unwisely. Secondly, it.is desirable 
to have the will of the sovereign behind the law, for al­
though law is very important, it cannot be the background 
of all civil order. Law is essentially static, and thus 
ties a society to the level of past achievement. Hobbes’s 
appeal to sovereignty, then, is a release from outworn pre­
cedent .
Lamprecht, then, has advanced four propositions that 
he believes comprise the correct interpretation of Hobbes's 
political philosophy. It would appear, however, that he is 
alone, in his belief that his interpretation is correct.
Iheolasfe; .interpretation which will be considered in 
this chapter is that of Nathaniel H. Henry, who advances 
the thesis that Hobbes is not an atheist.1 Henry has mar­
shalled the courage to enter Hobbes’s labyrinth of biblical 
verse, a maze which most scholars of Hobbes are quite con­
tent tO’= passuover. This author arrives at his conclusion
•^Nathaniel H. Henry, ’’Milton and Hobbes: Mortalism 
and the Intermediate 'State,” Studies in Philology,
(1951), 234-239o
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from an examination of Hobbes’s view of the intermediate 
state, i.e., that dimension of space or time where the son! 
is resident before it goes to either heaven or hell,
According to Henry, Hobbes presents the problem of 
the intermediate state when he quotes from John iii, 13;
”no man has ascended into heaven but he that come down from 
heaven,”^ Hobbes then quotes from Acts ii, 34,.' where 
St. Peter, ”■ to prove the ascension of Christ,’*’ quoted Psalm 
xvi:
’thou will not leave my soul in hell, nor 
suffer thine holy one to see corruption,’ saith, 
they were spoken, not of David, but of Christ; 
and to prove it added this reason, ’For David 
is not ascended into ’heaven»’2
At this point, asserts Henry, Hobbes sets forth the crux
of his position on soul sleeping, for which he gives the
Calvinist answer:3
’But to this a man may easily answer, and 
say that though their bodies were not to ascend 
till the general day of judgment, yet these 
souls were in heaven as soon as they departed 
from their bodies,, „„ ’4
What Hobbes says in the next sentence appears to 
buttress his Calvinist position:
•̂ -Henry, op, cit<,„ 242 „
2Ibid.
^When a man dies, what happens to his soul? In 
Christian theology there is the problem of an intermediate 
state between death and the final day of judgment„ Some 
say the soul sleeps during this time, while others main­
tain that it wanders about, waiting for resurrection,,
4Henry, op0 cite, 242„
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’oooWhich also seemth to be confused by 
the words of our savior (Luke 20:37,38), who 
proving the resurrection out of the words of 
Moses, saith thus, ’that the dead are raised, 
even Moses shewed at the bush, when he cal-- 
leth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the 
God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob„ For he 
is not a God of the dead, but of the living; 
for they live by him„’l
What follows in the next paragraph, according to 
Henry, is an extension and expansion of the Calvinist posi­
tion as regards election and predestination;
’But if these words to be understood (sic) 
only on the morality of the soul, they prove 
not at all that which our savior intended to 
prove, which was the resurrection of the body, 
that is, to say, the immortality of manD .
Therefore our savior meaneth that those pat­
riarchs were immortal; not by a property con­
sequent to the essence and nature of mankind; 
but by the will of God, that was pleased of 
his mere grace, to bestow eternal life upon 
the faithful,^
Out of the above paragraphs taken from Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, Henry concludes that Hobbes's religious position 
is that of an orthodox Calvinist, The above interpretation 
perhaps furnishes excellent proof of the contention that 
virtually any meaning can be read into Hobbes’s philosophy 
by utilizing certain paragraphs and excluding others,
As the reader has easily discerned, the attempts to 
resolve the inherent difficulties in Hobbes’.s' tBxt. .have only 
compounded those difficulties. It is with this view-in 
mind, perhaps, that the traditionalists have taken such 
violent issue with the innovaters.
XI bid, 
2Ibid«
CHAPTER III
REBUTTALS AND COUNTER-REBUTTALS
Generally speaking, any innovation or departure 
from the norm is greeted by skepticism., This skepticism 
often manifests itself in written or verbal defenses of 
the traditional, which in turn occasions a series of coun­
ter-arguments from the innovators. The contemporary study 
of Hobbes’s political philosophy is characterized by pre­
cisely this kind of situation, for at the present time com­
petent students of political theory are quarreling over 
what Hobbes actually meantCertainly these scholars must 
realize that since they are battling in the realm of in­
terpretation, no one view is entirely correct. Neverthe­
less,, the controversies become quite pungent at times.
The first set of debates centers around Oakeshott’s 
interpretation of the Leviathan, with the participants be­
ing two English scholars, J. M. Brown of Kings College, New 
Castle.upon Tyne, and Dorothea Krook of Newham College, 
Cambridge. The -precipitant of this altercation was an ar­
ticle by Brown in which he takes issue with certain parts 
of Oakeshott’s interpretation. Altogether, Brown differs 
on .some eight points with Oakeshott. However, for th'e 
purpose of this discussion, several of these points will
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be combined.^
Firstly, Brown asserts that Oakeshott has introduced 
the political covenant prematurely,, i.e., he believes Oake­
shott has misread Hobbes's second law of nature as requiring
pmen to enter into a single agreement. This agreement then 
solidifies into a covenant, which in turn becomes a poli­
tical covenant. Brown asserts, however, that Hobbes did 
not introduce the political covenant until later.^ Contin­
uing, Brown maintains that Oakeshott has altered the third 
law of nature so to direct men to keep their promises under 
the agreement they make with each other. In addition to 
this, Oakeshott misquotes the very pasage where Hobbes in­
troduces the political covenant, for Brown asserts: "In 
the words Professor Oakeshott selects from this passage 
'covenant' refers to covenants other than and unsupple­
mented by the political covenant.”4 Oakeshott inserts a 
definite article before "covenant” and makes the words re­
fer to the political covenant itself. Such perversions, 
according to Brown, obscure the difference'between Hobbes's 
first and second parts, thus causing the true nature of 
chapters fourteen and fifteen to be lost. After Oakeshott
4j„ M. Brown, "A Note on Professor Oakeshott's Intro­
duction to the Leviathan." Political Studies, 1(1953), 53-64.
2Ibid.. 54.
3lbid.
4lbid.
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has tortured Hobbes into saying that something besides the 
political covenant is needed, he also forces Hobbes to say 
what that is* This new factor is a supreme authority with 
enough power to enforce the political covenant perpetually.^ 
The real purpose of page 112, however, suggests Brown, is 
to show that the political covenant is necessary to create 
a power strong enough to secure peace, and not that there 
must be a supreme power to enforce the political covenant.
If there was such a power to enforce covenants, the poli­
tical covenant would not be necessary.
Secondly, Brown strongly disagrees with Oakeshott’s 
version of Hobbes's theory of obligation. He believes that 
Hobbes’s doctrine does contain moral obligations, but not 
the kinds that Oakeshott describes, and furthermore that 
Oakeshott’s explanation of Hobbes’s different uses of the 
word ” oblige” is ’’nothing more than an attempt to get us 
to read Hobbes in a way that will suit Professor Oake­
shott’s preconceptions.”3 Brown avers that the only pas­
sage where Hobbes compares different uses of the term ’’ob­
ligation” is not in the Leviathan at all, but in De Cive. 
Here Hobbes distinguishes between two types of natural ob­
ligation which, as one would guess, correspond to the 
"physical” and "rational” obligations of Oakeshott. The
1Ibid., 55o
2Ibid.
3Ibid.. 57.
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actual passage where Hobbes speaks of the law of nature as 
binding, contends Brown, is not one where the context re- 
quires obligation to be understood in Oakeshott?s rational 
sense. There is the possibility that these laws are moral­
ly obligatory because they are the commands of God, How­
ever, this is only a possibility. In any event, Brown is 
more concerned about what Oakeshott does in the political 
regions of Hobbes's doctrine. This leads Brown into a 
criticism of what he terms the "paradox of the covenant. 
Oakeshott,. asserts Brown, entertains the view that the 
moral obligation does not originate in the social contract, 
but rather is contingent upon the sovereign's command; i, 
e«,. the covenant does not make anything morally obligatory. 
The covenant itself becomes binding in a moral sense only 
when the sovereign commands its observance. For Brown this 
view is ridiculous, for he asserts that the law would have 
no effect except for subjects who were previously obliged 
to obey it. This prior obligation is created only by the 
political covenant, Oakeshott?s inclusion of physical ob­
ligation in political obligation is also rejected at this 
time, for Brown contends that the conception of a sovereign 
not delegated to act for his subjects would be a self- 
contradiction for Hobbes,
Thirdly, Brown criticizes Oakeshott's interpreta­
tion of the sovereign-to-subject relationship. On this.
3.1 bid.. 5$o
vital point, asserts Brown, all Oakeshott does is to tell 
us that the institution of the sovereign rights is illus­
trative of their general scope, i.e., the nature of the 
sovereign’s rights is determined by the social contract„ 
The rights of the sovereign authority are those which 
have been transferred to it by covenant, and ”5’since what 
was transferred was the natural right of every man to do 
what he wills, the rights in the sovereign must be those 
of a natural man.5 For Brown this view is not plau­
sible, as it does not explain how the sovereign gets his 
authority. Nor does he accept Oakeshott’s explanation 
, that the right to all things is surrendered to the sov­
ereign. The notion of a transferrance of a ’’right to 
all things” is for Brown both highly obscure and unveri- 
fiable in Hobbes’s doctrine. In any event, none of Oake- 
shott’s assertions even remotely resemble the points 
made in the seventeenth chapter, from whence he draws his 
references? What this chapter does contain, asserts Brown, 
is an argument to show that the sovereign cannot do in­
justice, in the strict sense of injury, to his subjects, 
’’because he can make no covenant to them upon his obser­
vance of which their authorization of his acts should de­
pend.”2
Fourthly, Brown disagrees with Oakeshott’s as-
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sertion that the sovereign has duties but no obligations.
"The meaning of this/’ contends Brown, TTis never cleared 
up."1 In view of pages forty-five and forty-nine of 
Oakeshott’s introduction, "duties" in the case of a heathen 
sovereign could apparently only mean "functions," while in 
the case of a Christian sovereign they would mean "moral 
obligation." In accord with Oakeshott’s supplementary ac­
count of obligation neither the heathen nor any other sov­
ereign could have duties in the sense of functions. How­
ever, for Oakeshott, the sovereign’s prime duty is the 
making of laws, i.e., he lays down a general rule which cre­
ates the artificial distinction peculiar to civil society, 
the distinction between right and wrong. These categories 
replace the surrendered natural right as the consequence 
of sovereignty, and from whence it follows that "no law can
pbe unjust." For Brown this is a puzzling passage. Oake­
shott refers to the twenty-sixth chapter in connection with 
it, at which time Brown asserts that it is a misreading of 
the beginning of this cahpter. But, for Brown, this chap­
ter means something else, for it is at this point that 
Hobbes defines civil laws as those rules under which the 
commonwealth commands the subject to make use of the distinc­
tion between right and wrong. And he does not, as Oakeshott 
maintains, say that civil laws create the distinction be-
^Ibid.
2Ibid., 61.
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tween right and wrongo Hobbes points out that the civil 
laws are the rules of "just and u n j u s t n o t h i n g  being re­
puted unjust that is not contrary to some law. Brown con- 
dludes by saying that Oakeshott misreads all this to make 
it support his general views about Hobbes, "whereas the 
passage is neither for nor against these views, but is sim­
ply irrelevant to them."'*'
Fifthly, asserts Brown, Oakeshott*s preconceptions 
prevent- him from giving even an intelligible account of 
the liberties of the subject* Brown feels that Hobbes dis­
tinguishes between liberties that arise from the silence of 
law, and the "'true liberties of the subject...the things 
which though commanded by the sovereign, he may neverthe­
less, without injustice, refuse to do.'"2 Oakeshott be­
gins by speaking of the former as if it were the whole mat­
ter, then switches to the latter, and then back to the for­
mer. In the end Brown feels that Oakeshott*s
vague notion of 'transfer,' from sub­
jects to sovereign, of a right to all things 
consisting in an absence of moral obligation, 
and his failure to explore the notion of 'in­
jury,' leave him unable to report, or even 
investigate, Hobbes's discussion of this whole subject.3
In conclusion, Brown takes issue with Oakeshott's 
interpretation of the role of the last two books of the
1Ibido
2Ibid.
^Ibid.. 62.
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Leviathan, Oakeshott feels that in these books the Hob- 
besian man emerges as a Christian, and consequently the 
Hobbesian man must acknowledge obligation under the law 
of God, Therefore, all that Hobbes says about natural 
law in the earlier chapters is an irrelevant anticipation 
of the argument of the last two chapters of the book. 
Hence, concludes Oakeshott, the Leviathan and De Cive are 
best read backwards. Brown, on the other hand, asserts 
that for Hobbes "the ’laws of nature* are not rules of 
moral obligation except to him as takes them as commands 
of God,”'*' However, the taking of these commands as the 
laws of God does not necessarily involve the acceptance 
of the Christian or any other scriptures. For Brown, 
then, the last two books of the Leviathan are a masterly 
special application, and in no way a correction of what 
preceeds them.
In the final analysis, Brown believes that Oake­
shott has misrepresented Hobbes throughout. He also 
feels that, in spite of Oakeshott*s criticisms of the 
myths about Hobbes, his whole tendency is to support in 
his own way an old myth —  that Hobbes’s political thought 
consists in the application to political matter of a dog­
matic and unintelligible moral philosophy.
Mrs. Dorothea Krook, in her article, starts with 
the intention of defending Oakeshott’s views, but ends up
~*~Ibid., 63 0
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by setting forth her own interpretation,^ Krook sets the 
temper of her argument at the very beginning with the as­
sertion that Brown’s reading of the Leviathan is marred by 
such a lamentable lack of comprehension that even when it 
appears he has something interesting to say, it turns out
pto be interesting only as a misconstruction.
In the first place, she criticizes Brown for in­
terpreting the Leviathan as an account of a general hypo­
thetical sequence of events, "followed by a _’masterly 
special application’ to a particular historical situation," 
and for failing to understand Hobbes’s modus operandi,3 
The virtue of Oakeshott, contends Krook, is that he rec­
ognizes the Leviathan as a logical structure, while at 
the same time he perceives Hobbes's method clearly. 
Furthermore, it is characteristic of a logical work that 
it can b;e read backwards, and in fact it must be if it is 
to yield its full meaning. The Leviathan is a case in 
point, for we cannot understand part one (human nature) 
unless we have part two (commonwealth) in our minds when 
we are reading it. In a sense, then, we do read from 
part two back to part one. That is, we read from the the­
ory of the commonwealth back to the theory of man, which
-^Dorothea Krook, "Mr, Brown’s Note; Annotated," 
Political Studies(1953), 216-227,
2Ibid,, 216,
3Ibid,
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1is its logical ground in the structure of the Leviathan, 
Similiarly, part three must be read back into parts one 
and two,
for it is Christian men and a generation 
of the Christian commonwealth that.Hobbes has 
in mind all the time: it is only the final
proof of this that is postponed to parts two 
and four, the ’proof’ consisting in the ~
Hobbesian reinterpretation of the Scriptures.
Furthermore, Brown’s view of Hobbes modus operandi 
is not valid, i.e., for Brown believes that Hobbes devel­
oped his doctrine in a series of discrete steps, neither 
knowing nor caring what was ahead of each. According to 
Krook, Hobbes knew what he wanted to prove before he be­
gan —  his consequences were implicit in his premises.
In the second place, Krook proceeds to criticize 
certain of Brown’s assertions. As for the political cov­
enant, this critic is not so certain that it was not in­
troduced before page 112 of the Leviathan, for before 
part two there are explicit statements about commonwealth, 
and its characteristics and consequences. Furthermore, 
asserts Krook,
it follows by necessary eonsquence from 
Hobbes’s account of the nature of man, and is 
stated explicitly on more than one occasion 
before page 112, that all human covenants 
must be ’political covenants’ -- if by ’po­
litical’ covenant Mr. Brown means the 'only 
thing he can mean, a covenant rendered ef-
1Ibid.. 217. 
2Ibid.
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fieacious by the power to enforce the prom­
ise made.l
In Hobbes’s definition, the pdwer to enforce the keeping 
of promises among men is an essential part of the word 
’’covenanto" So the validity of Brown’s distinction be­
tween pre-political and political covenants is a moot 
point, because the passage on page 112 where Hobbes in­
troduces the political covenant is a logical statement 
and.not a historical or hypo-histroical one„
There is neither a sequence of events 
in time nor even a hypothetical sequence 
in hypothetical time, but only premises 
and deductions, antecedents and conse­
quents, definitions and the meaning of def­
initions
According to Krook, Brown’s characterization of the last 
two books of the Leviathan is highly misleading, if not 
positively false0 She feels that these books form a 
vital and integral part of the Leviathan, It is clear 
to Hobbes that parts three and four are vitally necessary 
to the theory of the commonwealth in part two, and fur­
thermore it is false to suggest, as Brown does,, that the 
problem of scriptures is not approached until the thirty- 
second chapter,, Rather, Hobbes as early as chapter four­
teen is interpreting certain text of the Holy Scriptures 
when he speaks of the natural laws„3 For example, the
1Ibid., 21$ „ 
2Ibido. 219o 
3Ibid.. 220.
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second law of nature is the "Golden Rule" paraphrased. 
Krook asserts that the integral position of parts.three 
and four in the argument of the Leviathan can best be y. 
understood in the light of two aspects of Hobbes’s Chris­
tian thought, namely, his nominalistie philosophy and his 
skeptical view of scriptural interpretations."*'
Hobbes’s attitude towards the church in parts 
three and four must be distinguished from his views to­
wards religion in part one. In part one, contends Krook, 
Hobbes’s attitude was determined by his materialistic 
metaphysic, whereas his attitude towards the dhurch in 
parts three and four is that of a civil philosopher.
This accounts for his scornful treatment of religion, 
and yet his. conspicuously sober and serious treatment 
of the church. Hobbes recognizes that the church is a 
powerful political institution in a civil society, and 
thus deserving of respectful treatment.2 For Hobbes’s 
peculiar kind of Erastianism the problems of conflicting 
loyalties between the church and state do not exist — > 
he does not acknowledge the crucial difference in kind. 
The word of God is nothing but black marks upon paper, 
which have meaning only by arbitrary imposition. Conse­
quently, contends Krook, the problem of the relation of 
Church and State is reduced to the problem of who shall
1Ibid.. 221o
2Ibid.
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interpret the Scriptures, and since Hobbes has already ahr- ■
swered this question,
he must attempt a reinterpretation of 
the Scriptures that will establish and sup­
port the supreme sovereignty of the civil 
magistrate against the usurping claims of 
the ecclesiastical authority...1
Brown, then, has failed to understand this, i.e.. Brown
does not understand that Hobbes must accept a Christian
Commonwealth;, and thus Hobbes is forced to undertake the
difficult and^delicate task of reinterpreting the Scrip- 
otures.
The next point with which Krook deals is Brown's 
treatment of the Hobbesian theory of obligation. She 
feels that Brown’s remarks "are marred by a false dis­
junction, which springs from the;more general misunder­
standing already n o t i c e d . According to Brown, moral 
obligation is ultimately derivative from God’s commands 
or some other source. If it seems to be contingent upon 
both, then Hobbes is inconsistent about its derivation. 
Krook feels, however, that the two sources are not mutual­
ly exclusive. Hobbes’s doctrine of obligation consists in 
a moral obligation to do whatever one takes to be God’s 
commands. But one does not know God’s commands until the 
sovereign lays them down, therefore moral obligation has
•k[bid o, 222
2Ibid„, 223
^Ibid., 224
another ground, i.e-., the absolute power of the sovereign 
to declare and enforce the only interpretation of God's 
commands that shall prevail in the commonwealth0̂
Lastly, Krook criticizes Brown's interpretation of 
the Hobbesian doctrine of right and wrong in relation to 
civil law. She contends that Brown's argument only gives 
one measure of his misunderstanding of Hobbes's fundamen­
tal philosophical doctrine, namely, nominalism. All 
definition is for Hobbes, "strictly and exclusively nom­
inal," and all knowledge is a matter of setting down defi­
nitions and drawing out the logical consequences of those 
2definitions.
But Krook was not to have the last word., for Brown 
retorted with acrid invective. Perhaps the counter-rebut­
tal by Brown epitomizes the bellicose temper of this con­
troversy.-^ He commences his article with the assertion 
that Krook's charge against him of a lack of understanding 
of Hobbes’s method is beyond credibility. He further con­
tends that he does recognize the Leviathan as a logical 
structure, and that the assertion of Krook to the contra­
ry is a mystification to him. Krook’s problem is to trace 
the logical structure of the Leviathan, and Brown feels 
that she attempts to solve this enigma without reading the
3-Ibid., 22$.
2Ibid., 226.
3J„ M. Brown, "Hobbest A Rejoinder," Political 
Studies, 11(1954) . 166-172, “
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book. Brown then proceeds to reiterate his interpretation 
of Hobbes’s concept of obligation and of the institution 
of: the political -covenant.^
Moreover, Brown contends that Krook has misrepre­
sented his view of the last two books of the Leviathan„ 
Rather, Brown contends, he still maintains as before that 
it is in the twenty-second chapter where Hobbes deals with 
the problem of the Scriptures. This contention, however, 
does not say that the Christian Scriptures are not involved 
in Hobbes’s construction of the natural laws.
Lastly, Brown views with amazement Krook’s assump­
tion that he agrees with Oakeshott’s interpretation of the 
definitions of justice and injustice in the civil state.
On top of this, asserts Brown, Krook then proceeds to lec­
ture him on nominalism.
The last paragraph of Brown’s article is perhaps 
representative of his attitude towards Krook.
The falsification, as compared with 
the truthful representation, of the clas­
sical political theorists, admittedly re« 
quires less time, makes quite as good lit­
erature, sets off equally well one’s own 
ideas, and facilitates the writing of his­
tories of thought: but it remains falsifi­
cation.!
The next controversy that will be discussed is 
neither so broad nor so acrid. For in this controversy 
it would appear that the opponents hold great respect for
-̂Ibid., 172.
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each other as scholars, however, not enough so that they
will accept other’s views instead of their own. This
\
particular intellectual polemic centers around the inter­
pretations of Hobbes’s theory of obligation by Taylor and 
Warrender. The first article, chronologically, in this 
debate is by John Plamenatz, a gentleman of the tradi­
tional school.'*' It is Plamenatz's principal contention 
that Warrender renders his own thesis untenable by his two 
admissionss namely, that the Hobbesian man always acts 
from hope of some benefit, or from fear of some hurt to 
himself, and that the laws of nature are not obligatory 
when considered only by their content, but are binding only 
as the commands of a God whose power is irresistible.'
Plamenatz asserts it is possible that Hobbes be­
lieved man must first be obligated by the laws of nature as 
commands of God before he is required to obey the civil sov­
ereign. It is possible, also, that unless men feared God, 
they could never have a sufficient motive for obeying the 
sovereign and thus making his power effective. What 
Plamenatz does deny is that Hobbes needed to hold these 
views to explain how men can be obligated to obey their
worldly rules, "or how they can have a sufficient motive
2for such obedience." It is difficult to discern at this
^-John Plamenatz, "Mr. Warrender’s Hobbes," Politi­
cal Studies. V(1957), 295-308.
2Ibid.. 298.
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point whether Plamenatz is criticizing Warrender, or trying 
to refute Hobbes within his own system,, Nevertheless, in 
Plamenatz’s opinion, men are said to be constrained when 
they stand in such a relation to someone who commands them, 
that "if they see that relation clearly, they cannot choose 
but do what is commanded of them."'*' Therefore, where men 
are unequal, either physically or mentally, there may be 
obligations among them that would not necessarily be con­
tingent upon a prior obligation to obey God. Furthermore, 
asserts Plamenatz, Hobbes does not say that power must be 
irresistible to justify any action —  he only says that ir­
resistible power alone can justify all actions. This Hob- 
besian contention thus nullifies Warrender1s thesis that 
only irresistible power alone can justify obligation. Ac­
cording to Plamenatz, we are obligated at all times to obey 
God, because his punishments are inescapable, "in the sense 
that, whenever we see clearly how we stand in relation to 
him, we cannot help but chose to do what he requires of us."2 
The fact that some of the punishments of the sovereign can 
be avoided, however, does not effect the nature of our ob­
ligation to him, only the extent. This situation in no way 
requires that we should be previously bound to obey God be­
fore we can be obliged to obey the sovereign. All that is 
needed, asserts Plamenatz, if there is to be obligation as
1Ibid., 297o
2Ibid.. 299o
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Hobbes understood it,
is that there should be commands issued 
by someone so powerful that those who are 
called upon to obey stand to gain more than 
they lose by doing what he requires of them.
There is a sufficient motives then, to set up political 
obligation, even in a godless world, for as soon as the a- 
greement is made and the ruler chosen, it becomes the in­
terest of most men to support him most of the time in what 
he does. A majority of the subjects will endorse the sov­
ereign's sanctions upon the few subjects who disobey.
Another fault which Plamenatz finds in the argument 
of Warrender is that if we must do what God commands because 
his power is irresistible, why is his third law of nature 
conditional? That is, God commands us to keep our covenants
only if other parties have already kept them, or we have ad-
2equate grounds for believing that they will do so. This 
qualification, asserts Plamenatz, means that we must al­
ready have an adequate motive for keeping the covenant 
which establishes the sovereign, and that the command of 
God for us to obey it is only secondary. The need for se­
curity is the motive which explains obedience, even in a 
godless world of selfish men without hope of a life after 
death. According to Plamenatz, then, the fear of God can 
only add a further motive to one which is already sufficient
1Ibid.
2Ibid., 3.00.
without that fear. ’’Once again, God is superfluous.”1
Another confusing point for Plamenatz is Hobbes’s 
emphasis on God, that is, if the only thing we can know of 
him is his existence, for his nature is incomprehensible to 
us. Furthermore, it is only through revelation that we know 
there is a life after death, and the sovereign must tell us 
what revelation to believe. This presents a very perplexing 
problem to Plamenatz, as is easily illustrated in this para­
graph :
Thus it is on. the sovereign’s authority 
that we receive the belief without which we 
have no motive for fearing God...lit'is on the 
sovereign authority that we receive the doc- 
trine without which it could not be our duty 
to keep the covenant to obey the sovereign.2
In the next place, Plamenatz does not see why War- 
render, in the light of his main thesis, includes the cov­
enant in Hobbes’s political philosophy. For, as Plamenatz 
asserts,
if all Hobbes wanted to do was to show 
that no ruler can have power unless at least ; 
some of his subjects obey him from other mo-? 
tives than from being punished by him, he had 
no need to resort to a covenant to make his 
point. On the other hand (and this is more 
likely) if what he wanted was to show that 
all rightful obedience of man to man rests 
on covenant, he attempted the impossible
Here again it would seem that Plamenatz is attempting to
T̂bid., 3D1.
2Ibid.. 303. 
^Ibid.
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prove Hobbes wrong, while using Warrender as an opponent.
In conclusion, Plamenatz disagrees with Warrender’s 
definition of natural right, i.e., a freedom from obligation 
to renounce a right. For Plamenatz, natural right is merely 
the absence of obligation. This leads to his disagreement 
with Warrender’s contention that a subject is not responsible 
for the action of the sovereign, even though he authorizes 
his action. According to Plamenatz, Hobbes says again and 
again that the sovereign cannot injure his subjects because 
they are the author of all his sovereign acts. Hobbes means 
that they are, is some sense or other, responsible for what 
the sovereign does.
Warrender wrote a rebuttal to Plamenatz’s article, 
but it will not be examined until two other arguments con­
cerning the same subject have been discussed.
The second scholar who takes issue with Warrender 
is Thomas Nagel, of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Al­
though Nagel is doubtlessly an astute scholar, his article 
suffers from obscurities and complexities. In his article 
Nagel attempts to show that genuine moral obligation plays 
no part in the Leviathan at all, ’’but that what Hobbes calls 
moral obligation is based exclusively on considerations of 
rational self-interest.”^ Nagel feels that an egotistic 
theory of motivation permeates the whole book. This theory
-̂ •Thomas Nagel, ’’Hobbes Concept of Obligation,” 
Philosophical Review, LXVII(1959), 68-83 «>
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is brought out with particular clarity in Hobbes’s laws of 
naturei,i his explanation of why certain rights are inalien­
able, and his stipulation about what sort of covenants the 
Hobbesian man can or cannot be conceived to have made.
According to Nagel, there are in Warrender’s ac­
count two separate systems: a theory of motivation, and a 
theory of obligation. The first has self-preservation as 
its supreme principle, based upon the fact that all men 
will regard death as the greatest evil; whereas the second 
is based upon the duty to obey natural law as the will of 
God.2
Nagel, however, takes a disapproving view of the 
above thesis and accordingly attempts to refute them.
For Warrender, asserts Nagel, the reason.a person can do 
his duty is because he is able to see it as a means to 
his self-preservation, but the reason he ought to do it 
is because God commands it. Self-preservation is the re­
quisite condition and not the ground of legal and moral 
obligation. Any law to bind must satisfy certain demands 
of the one upon whom it is binding. Nagel goes so far as 
to endorse a concept of validating conditions, but he dif­
fers from Warrender in regard to the source of these, ob­
ligations. According to Nagel, Warrender maintains that
%agel, op. cit., 69-70.
2Ibid., 7 0.
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a person must be capable of.having an 
adequate motive to obey the law (which he 
claims is involved in the notion that ought 
implies can), plus the empirical fact that 
since men perform only those actions which 
they believe to be in their own self-inter­
est, only in rare circumstances ean anyone 
have an adequate motive to contribute to 
his own destruction or not to resist others 
in attempts on his life. All obligatory 
actions must be at least capable of being 
regarded by the individual concerned as in 
his best personal interest; therefore self- 
destruction and the like are never obligatory.
This, according to Nagel, is Warrender*s method of denying 
that self-interest is the ground of Hobbes’s theory of 
obligation. Frankly, this is a rather confusing assertion.
On the other hand, Nagel believes that the Hob- 
besian man can never perform any action unless he believes 
it to be in his own self-interest, i.e., all actions must, 
be immediately perceived as conducive to self-interest.
The Hobbesian man is susceptible only to selfish motiva­
tion, and therefore can not perform any action that could 
be labeled moral. Warrender’s own admission, contends 
Nagel, that the Hobbesian man can never act voluntarily 
without having as an object his own personal good, is the 
downfall of any attempt to put0 a moral construction on 
Hobbes’s concept of obligation. Nothing may be called a 
moral obligation which in principle never conflicts with 
self-interest. A person so motivated could never have a
1I-bid., 73.
2Ibid., 74.
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feeling of genuine moral duty.
Nagel also takes issue with Warrender*s proposition 
that the laws of nature are obligatory only as the commands 
of God. Nowhere, asserts Nagel, does Hobbes say that only 
the commands of an authority can be obligatory ■—  all he 
says is that the commands of an authority are laws. Ac­
cordingly, Nagel denies that natural laws derive their bind­
ing status because they proceed from God. For him Hobbes’s 
primary ground of obligation is prudential, with even the 
obligation to obey God being grounded on sagacity!* This 
critic bases his conclusions on Hobbes’s afterthought to 
his laws of nature where, he ’’says that his calling of these 
precepts ’laws’ is not strictly correct, since only the 
commands of an authority are properly called laws.”-*- Ac­
cording to Nagel, the role of God in the Hobbesian system 
is manifold. Firstly, He is the omnipotent ruler of his 
natural kingdom, His subjects being those who.believe He 
exists and governs. Secondly, He functions as the cause
of all things, all men’s passions, desires, and appetites
2being caused by God’s will. Lastly, and negatively, He 
is not the basis of moral obligation, for the ..laws of na­
ture are obligatory in themselves. They may derive some 
moral obligation as being the commands of God, but these 
are not their general grounds. Furthermore, contends
1Ibid., 7 6. 
2Ibid., 7 9.
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Nagel, a system of obligation which has at its apex the 
authority of a person, and not a principle, could never 
properly be called a moral system„ For morality in a true 
sense is not a product of sovereign fiat. In the last ana­
lysis Nagel endorses the following position;
It is a mistake to say that God is the 
ultimate appeal for Hobbes, for, if that 
were so, then all things which He ordered 
would be of equal obligatoriness, and when­
ever He changed his orders, our obligations 
would change. The essentials of Hobbes’s 
system are a set of principles concerned 
mainly with the preservation of human so­
ciety, and if those principles were changed, 
it would not be the same system.^
The third major attemot to refute the Taylor the-
psis is made by S. M. Brown, Jr., of Cornell University.
This critic is rather dismayed at the acceptance of the 
Taylor thesis by contemporary scholars. He states that the 
controversies about the interpretation of Hobbes’s theory 
have been for the most part between scholars who completely 
endorse the Taylor thesis and those who disagree only as to 
what in detail Hobbes’s non-prudential theory of obligation
-k[bid., 80.
^S. M. Brown, Jr., ’’Hobbes; The Taylor Thesis,” Phil- 
'osophical Review, LXVIII(1959), 303-323. Stuart M. Brown, Jr., 
a professor of philosophy at Cornell University„ was born in 
1914. He received his Bachelor of Science and his Doctor 
of Philosophy degrees from Cornell University. Brown cur­
rently instructs in the fields of ethics and political the­
ory. Also during his career he has written several articles. 
Directory of American Scholars. 3rd ed., 1957, 96.
■3"a. M. Brown, Jr., op. cit.„ 304.
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Strangely enough, Brown places Oakeshott in the sec­
ond category, saying that because Oakeshott construes self- 
interest as rational obligation he disengages Hobbes1s eth­
ical theory proper from his egotistical psychology. That 
is, Oakeshott's rational obligation is an internal and psy­
chological phenomenon which supplies no principle for the 
authorization of the sovereign.
Brown’s major contention is that the Taylor thesis 
is false, for he holds that
Hobbes does not in fact hold and cannot 
in principle admit, that the statements com­
prising his psychology have no logical bear­
ing on the statements compromising his ethi­
cal theory. 1
Brown, in attempting to prove the Taylor thesis 
false, employs two principal considerations. In the first 
place, he contends, there is Hobbes's own testimony about 
what he is doing in his political treatises. As a political 
theory often has practical implications adverse to the in­
terests of men, the political philosopher must establish his
major doctrines by vigorous arguments from premises that
2cannot be denied. Hobbes follows this procedure, for he 
grounds the sovereign's right and both the duty and liberty 
of the subjects on the known natural inclinations of man­
kind. Hobbes explicitly denies that his ethical theory is 
independent of his psychology. Consequently, contends
-klbid., 3 0 7.
2Ibid.. 30B.
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Brown, the Taylor thesis, as an account of Hobbes in terras
1of what Hobbes thinks and is trying to accomplish, is false! 
The proponents of the Taylor thesis in fact disregard Hobbes’s 
logical standards, and interpret his doctrine as if such stan­
dards were irrelevant. According to Brown, the attempt to
piece together a logically independent doctrine out of Hob-
2.bes’s theory is to emasculate him. What Hobbes demands 
for a political theory is logical .support for moral and po­
litical doctrines which would otherwise remain unestablished 
and controversial; ’’and what the Taylor thesis has presented
as his theory is a set of doctrines which, lacking the re­
quired support, cannot constitute the theory.”3 Both Oake­
shott and Warrender appear to suppose that Hobbes’s thought 
is too lacking in clarity, precision, and vigor to be a.sysr 
tematic theory of the kind Hobbes himself thinks he is pre­
senting. But any interpretation based upon such a supposi­
tion is absurd, asserts Brown,
for if Hobbes thought is so loose to 
justify ignoring what he presents as his 
theory, it is absurd for a commentator:to
expound as Hobbes’s real theory a set of
doctrines which satisfy strict taste of 
clarity and consistency.4
Brown concludes this first argument with the contention that
1Ibid.
2Ibid,. 3 04.
3Ibid.
4 bid.. 309.
the Taylor thesis would be valuable as a side of Hobbes’s 
theory which the traditional interpretation tends to ignore 
i.e,s it could be employed to portray Hobbes as a man whose 
own moral and political convictions were not at every point 
compatible with the logical implications of his argument.
Brown’s second consideration is that the moral.doc­
trine (Taylor thesis), pieced together out of Hobbes and 
expounded sympathetically as a self-consistent theory, is 
in fact inconsistent and philosophically untenable. The 
proponents of the Taylor thesis must present a theory in 
which the concept of obligation is moral, as distinct from 
prudential, or legal, and in which psychological factors 
are not considered. Brown contends that this is impossible 
for in Hobbes’s doctrine the notion of the covenant is em­
ployed as the indispensible logical connection between po­
litical obligation and psychological considerations. It 
is used to link the obligation to obey the law with those 
human desires and aversions which give every citizen a 
stake in the institution of government. The duties of 
citizenship presuppose an obligation conceived in terms 
of the covenant, and covenanting presupposes interests at 
stake. Brown asserts?
In the Taylor thesis, the chain of 
presuppositions must be broken at the 
point where the moral considerations 
will be. together completely isolated 
from considerations of interest expli­
cated in psychological terms.1
^Ibid.. 311 o
This inconsistency, contends Brown, manifests itself in 
Oakeshott’s interpretation as a flat contradiction. At 
first the latter’s explanation of why the subjects should 
obey the sovereign is stated in terms of covenanting and 
is moral, i.e., the subjects authorize the sovereign by 
their own acts. In the next sentence, however, the moral 
explanation is contradicted and restated in terms of pos­
itive law, i.e., the covenant itself is not morally ob­
ligatory because it is not a law. The covenant is not 
the will of the sovereign and so it does not itself make 
any conduct morally obligatory. According to Brown, then* 
Oakeshott1s account is in the end legal, although he tries 
to make it moral.
Taylor’s difficulty is somewhat similar, as he 
begins by asserting that a man is obligated to be a good 
citizen because he has pledged himself in the covenant to 
be one, but then proceeds to argue that all obligation, 
including that of honoring covenants, is derived from the 
laws of nature as being the commands of God. Here again, 
says Brown, is a contradictions
I am obliged because I have covenanted; 
but as there would be no obligation to keep 
covenants unless some authority, God or 
civil sovereign, commands it, covenants of 
themselves do not oblige.•*-
Warrender, asserts Brown, avoids this contradic-
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tion by never giving Hobbes’s account of obligation solely 
in terms of a covenant or pledge. This position, however, 
attributes an absurdity to Hobbes; for natural law, as the 
command of God, does not guarantee performance, it only 
guarantees the obligation to perform. Furthermore, con­
tends Brown, Warrender’s distinction between atheists and 
theists, with respect to obligation, attributes no in­
trinsic moral content to natural law. Law in itself im­
poses no obligation, for if it did the atheist would be 
constrained, and it would not be necessary to provide a 
guarantee of the obligatory character of covenants. Ac­
cording to Brown, it follows from this that no one is ob­
liged.
For to say that natural law is the 
command of God is simply to say that a 
set of rules, lacking in moral content., 
is law in the strict sense. If an athe­
ist cannot incur an obligation to obey 
civil law, simply by acknowledging the 
status of the civil sovereign, then 
neither I nor anybody can incur an ob­
ligation to obey natural law simply by 
acknowledging the status of God as sov­
ereign in a kingdom of nature. What 
Warrender attributes to Hobbes as a the­
ory of obligation is a position in which 
no one can be obliged at all,4
For Brown, then, the Taylor thesis is false. It 
creates new difficulties for Hobbes based on mistakes he 
did not make. Moreover, Hobbes did not ask the two dis­
tinct questions; why ought I to do my duty, and how is
^Ibid,. 314*
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it psychologically possible for me to do it? This separa­
tion, contends Brown, implies that Hobbes wanted to make 
a distinction between moral and prudential questions, where 
as, in fact, he combines the two. The question before 
Hobbes is one in moral and civil prudence, i.e., how to 
establish unconditional submission to the civil state..
Brown concludes by saying that there is no justi­
fication for the view, advanced by Taylor and others, that 
natural laws are to be interpreted in either of two logi­
cally distinct ways: either as prudential maxims which im­
ply no obligations, or as commands of God which are ob­
ligatory. Hobbes’s psychology does not consist primarily 
of empirical statements, but bather of logical'statements, 
which justify the presumption of logically necessary con­
nections. Hence, statements like "Men necessarily desire 
their own good” are logical. The laws of nature, then, 
cannot be related to Hobbes’s egotism as prudential maxims. 
The following paragraph characterizes Brown's position:
Hobbes psychology is indispensible 
because in it he establishes the sense 
of good in terms of which he argues that 
the stake of each man in the institution 
of government is of supreme magnitude.
What is completely dispensible in Hobbes 
are prudential maxims and the commands, 
of God. The Taylor thesis grossly mis­
represents Hobbes’s because it dispenses 
with the indispensible and makes what is ^ 
dispensible the very heart of his theory.
So concludes what isvperhaps the most refined crit-
1I M d . , 323.
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icism of the Taylor thesis. But the controversy was not 
yet over, for Warrender has written a counter-rebuttal to 
Plamenatz, and he also has expressed his intention to an­
swer his other critics.
In the first place, Warrender feels that it is not 
always clear just how far Plamenatz disagrees with him, 
and just how far with Hobbes. Secondly., Warrender contends 
that Plamenatz puts too much emphasis on the place of God 
in Warrender’s interpretation. In support of this second 
contention, Warrender asserts that 3s far as parts one and 
two of his book are concerned, the place of God is not in­
volved, and any such references are only incidental to the 
argument. Parts one and two are concerned with piecing to­
gether the pattern of obligation, the conclusion being that 
everything is dependent upon the obligation to obey natural 
law. Provided this pattern has some prescriptive meaning, 
it holds good for Hobbes’s definition of obligation. Fur­
thermore, he says in part one, whichiis.concerned! with the 
question of what kind of obligation is evoked, that God is 
not an integral factor. Im-,this section Warrender sets 
forth three alternative solutions about what the remainder 
of Hobbes’s theory of obligation is based upon;
(i) divine rewards and punishments,
(ii) simply upon the will of God,
^Howard Warrender, ’’The Place of God in Hobbes Phil­
osophy; a Reply to Mr. Plamenatz,” Political Studies, VIII 
(I960), 46-57.
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(iii) a body of natural law having self- 
evident. or intrinsic authority,,!
According to Warrender, the first alternative seems 
to be the most likely for Hobbes, even though he himself 
would have preferred that Hobbes use the third one. In any 
event, all these solutions vary only within a narrow range 
—  they all result in some special status being given to 
natural law. Immediate status is given if natural law has 
intrinsic authority; and indirect status, if it is God’s 
unchangeable command. Consequently the whole system hangs 
upon natural law. Thus, if God were to be removed from 
Hobbes’s political doctrine, the thesis of Warrender’s book 
would not really be affected.
Thirdly, . Warrender asserts that, according to 
Plamenatz, God is superfluous in Hobbes’s system, on the 
grounds that Hobbes could have solved both the problem of 
political obligation and that of the motive for obedience 
by having civil government based on ordinary self-interest 
alone. Ordinary self-interest would eliminate not only 
God, but also the laws of nature as Warrender conceives 
them . 2
Apparently Pldmenatz and Warrender start from dif­
ferent definitions'of Hobbes’s theory of obligation. Ob­
ligation,1> for Plamenatz, is derived from a sanction that is
Ibid., 44.
2Ibid. i 50.
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sufficient if clearly apprehended. This sanction would 
operate on men permanently, provided they have due know­
ledge and reflection. Warrender holds that because only 
God exercises such a sanction, his is the only power that 
can produce obligation.-*- Moreover,, the ease where a per­
son exercises a sanction over another person is not obli­
gation per_se, but simply ’’power.” The power of the mas­
ter is the instrument of subjection. In any event, con­
tends Warrender, the situation where one has power over 
any other is impermanent in time, and does not necessarily 
bind other parties. Brute force requires something extra 
to produce genuine permanent obligation. Warrender ad­
mits that there is an analogy in Hobbes’s doctrine be­
tween God’s power and man’s power, which leads us to be­
lieve that there is nothing special about God’s power ex­
cept for its efficiency and amount. It is this same anal­
ogy, asserts Warrender, that underlies Plamenatz’s attempts 
to refute Hobbes within his own system. Warrender main­
tains, however, that the analogy is misleading, and fur­
thermore Hobbes does not follow it. The power of God dif­
fers from that of men in kind, not degree. God’s power is 
unknown and directed to support a rational body of princi­
ples -- the laws of nature; whereas the power of man is as­
sociated with visible signs and directed to serve the ends 
that the wielder of the power has set for himself. The
-^Ibido
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analogy is conceivably valid in the prophetic kingdom, 
where God has a personal relationship to His subjects, 
but certainly not in the natural kingdom -- the world. In 
His natural kingdom the power of God is introduced as a 
formal answer —  government in this kingdom being based on 
rational knowledge, with the limitations of reason to set 
its boundaries. The laws of nature are discerned through 
reason, and reason tells us very little more than this ex­
cept the necessity of some hypothesis to account for their 
formal statues. This hypothesis can be filled in accord­
ing to the individual’s belief and religion. A related 
point, asserts Warrender, is that for Hobbes, no obliga­
tion arises between the conqueror and the vanquished un­
less a covenant is made in which the defeated have prom­
ised obedience in return for their lives. Without such a 
covenant the conquered may act as they wish, subject only 
to physical restraint. Regardless, Hobbes thought that 
temporary leaders were inherently unstable, and thus could 
not form any firm basis for the establishment of the state.
Warrender also takes issue with. Plamenatz’s con­
tention that ordinary self-interest is enough to maintain 
the state, for he feels that at times there may be a dis­
crepancy between selfish interest and public interest. If 
such a discrepancy arises, an ample amount of state coer­
cive power would be difficult to achieve. Warrender points 
out that insurrections are often profitable.
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According to this critic, then, Hobbes’s theory 
needs a source of obligation strong enough to bind the sub­
ject to the degree of suicidal risk. This cannot derive 
from the ordinary principle of self-interest; it can only 
come from the obligation to obey natural law. Personal 
self-interest is not what makes certain acts obligatory, 
but rather is what suspends the obligation to do certain 
actions that would otherwise be obligatory. Moreover, 
the laws of nature are not strictly for personal preserva­
tion, rather they are rules for the preservation of men in 
general. To ’’preserve yourself” is not the formula re­
quired for the. :institution of the state, but rather ’’that 
all men can be preserved,” except where it is inconsistent 
with one’s own preservation, A formula of this kind could 
never have its origin in ordinary self-interest,
Warrender agrees with Plamenatz that the third law 
of nature is conditional. However, he feels that this is 
still compatible with his interpretation of Hobbes’s theory 
of obligation. The individual is not obligated to do any­
thing he honestly believes to be suicidal, but short of 
this he remains obligated to do his best, Warrender feels 
that if God is to be regarded as the author of moral laws, 
it is no more absurd for him to command a conditional pre­
cept, than it is to have a human system of conditional 
moral principles,^
-kibid, „• 56,
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Finally, Warrender does not agree with Plamenatz’s 
contention that we have to accept the sovereign’s interpre­
tation of the Scriptures in order to know God and his punish­
ments. He feels that this conclusion is unfair to Hobbes, 
for in Hobbes’s doctrine political obligation depends ulti­
mately on the laws of nature, which are known to all men 
by the use of reason, regardless of their political beliefs
Aor religion. Furthermore, the sovereign’s interpretation 
does not affect man’s inner beliefs, which depend on God’s 
grace. Warrender summarizes his ideas in the following para­
graph :
As Hobbes makes clear, the basic ob­
ligation to keep the political covenant 
is prior to anything that the sovereign 
decrees; otherwise there would be no need 
to take notice of what the sovereign had 
ordered, including, of course, his views 
on works of prophecy. Nothing essential, 
therefore, depends upon the sovereign’s 
interpretations.1
One other article, written by a man who has not ac­
tually been involved in the controversy himself, deserves 
to be discussed before this chapter is brought to a close. 
This article, written by Willis B. Glover of Mercer Uni­
versity, is concerned with Hobbes’s concept of God and the 
role He plays in Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy.2
1Ibid.
% .  B. Glover, ”God and Thomas Hobbes,” Church' His­
tory, -mx(1960). 275-297. Willis Border Glover, a professor 
of history at Mercer University, was born in 1915. He re­
ceived his higher education from Mississippi College, the 
University of Virginia, and Harvard University. Currently he
103
It is Glover’s contention that Hobbes is not an atheist. 
According to this author:, if one takes at face Value what 
Hobbes says about religion, "the set of opinions which e- 
merge is a combination of reformation theology with the 
discursive rationalism that was to characterize the eight­
eenth century...”'*' Hobbes conceives of a God who acts 
directly in nature and history, who is the source of right­
eousness, but is not in himself bound by any law of moral- 
2ity. Furthermore, Hobbes’s insists on the corporeality of 
God, but he does not deny that God is a spirit;
...he simply insisted that such spirits 
that exist are corporeal. Because he con­
ceived God to be a body, Hobbes had no par­
ticular difficulty with the idea of His prov­
idential activity. Bodies can move other 
bodies, and God, the cause of all causes, 
still operates directly on other bodies in 
accordance with his eternal purpose and 
foreknowledge of all things. Since the 
substance ./of. God was not like any other 
substance, Hobbes was able to avoid con­
tradicting at the point the inherited 
Christian conception of God as radically 
discontinuous with the created world.>
The attack on Hobbes by his contemporaries,
tends Glover, was not concerned with specific items
theology, but rather with the question of atheism.
he teaches modern intellectual history. During his career 
he has published one book on religion, entitled The Evangel­
ical Non-conformists and Higher Criticism in the Nineteenth 
Century. Directory of American Scholars; 3rd ed., 1957, 275.
■^Glover, op. cit., 276.
2Ibid.
3ibid.. 277.
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sical philosophy materialism was associated with atheism,
and consequently Hobbes, regardless of what he said to the
contrary, was thought to be an atheist. Hobbes terms this
practice "atheism by c o n s e q u e n c e A t  this point Glover
criticizes the contemporary interpreters who assume that
the seventeenth-century attitudes associated with some of
Hobbes's ideas must be the real attitude of Hobbes. The
author points out that those who consider Hobbes an atheist
"are forced to assume that he did not mean what he said on
2religion, and he said a great deal." Nearly anyone can be 
accused of being an atheist on the assumption that whatever 
he may have said to the contrary was not seriously meant^  
This method, contends Glover, has often caused serious mis­
understandings of Hobbes’s political philosophy. Three 
explanations have been given as to why Hobbes, although an 
atheist, should have written as he did;
(i) He aimed to destroy Christianity and 
the Bible by an elaborate reducto ad 
absurdum.
(ii) He cluttered his works with theistic 
suggestions and pronouncements in or­
der to protect himself from persecu­
tion for the atheistic basis of his 
politics and mechanics.
(iii) He sought to support his political 
views by the appeal to the beliefs 
of his readers.
•kEbid.. 27$.
2Ibid.. 2 7 9.
3Ibid.
^Ibid.
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On examining the above motives, contends Glover, 
one finds that they are either mutually inconsistent or im­
plausible. The first motive is not consistent with the other 
two, and while it is conceivable that the second and third 
motives do not contradict each other, they are both im­
plausible. Glover criticizes the contemporary savants, who.
realizing that religious pretense cannot 
be proved against Hobbes, and yet unable to 
free themselves from the traditional concep­
tion of Hobbes the atheist, have found his 
political writings so confusing that they con­
clude Hobbes must have been himself confused 
to have introduced God into his political 
philosophy at all.^
Glover singles out Plamenatz in particular. According to 
Glover, it is more plausible to assume that Hobbes believed 
in God, and that he wrote his political philosophy accord­
ingly.
Furthermore, Glover argues that the problem of church
and state is more crucial to Hobbes than most of his inter-
pretators have recognized. It has been assumed that his ,
state is entirely secular, and religion is a mere instrument
of the sovereign. This is not. the case, contends Glover, for
far from making religion a tool of the state, "Hobbes defines
the Christian state as a ehurch and ascribes to it a religious
mission which takes precedence over its legitimate worldly 
2concerns." Religion furnishes the limiting context within
XIbid.. 280.
2Ibid.. 281.
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which the sovereign can fulfill the ends of government and
1secure the-maximum development of his power. The contin­
uous obedience to natural laws. He is also subject to the 
law, however, and can succeed as sovereign only by obedience 
to those natural laws which are the conditions for the ex­
istence of the society he rules. Also, Glover believes, 
one of the sovereign’s prime d:uties is to insure the sal­
vation of his subjects. He points to the fact that the 
subject is not constrained when his eternal salvation is 
in jeopardy. Hobbes’s concern with the relationship of the 
state to Christianity and the difficulties involved make 
untenable any thesis that his religious expressions are in­
sincere or irrelevant.
In the end, Glover agrees with Taylor that Hobbes’s 
ethical system is basically deontological —  God’s command 
being the source of obligation.
The article by Glover thus concludes this analysis 
of the contemporary polemics concerning the political phil­
osophy of Hobbes. The variety of interpretations perhaps 
staggers the imagination of the student of Hobbes and in 
the end serve only to confuse him, for each of the inter­
pretations has some basis. Moreover, it is highly doubtful 
that a clear synthesis could ever be had from the above 
views; and even at best, a synthesis would only be an ap­
proximation of what Hobbes really meant.
^Ibid., 282o
CONCLUSION
Hobbes apparently anticipated a certain amount of 
confusion concerning the meaning of his theories, and to 
provide for this he wrote meticulously, even to the point 
of setting forth a list of definitions. It would appear, 
however, that Hobbes judged his prospective readers rather 
poorly for, if he were resurrected, he might view with 
amazement the disagreement among contemporary scholars 
regarding the actual meaning of his political philosophy.
He would perhaps endorse the contention that he was the au­
thor of a profoundly skeptical doctrine which finds the on­
ly solution to man’s predicament in force and coercion, 
but he might be astonished to discover himself being clas­
sified as a Kantian deontologist. In fact, it is highly 
probable that, if he attempted to explain his real intent, 
a few scholars would still disagree with him.
Resurrection, however, in this temporal world, is 
not possible, and so the real meaning of Hobbes’s political 
philosophy is forever obscured by the passage of time. 
Therefore, we can only be content with an approximation of 
it, by hoping that Hobbes wrote what he actually believed. 
There is an impediment here, however, for Hobbes’s works 
are for the most part written in a seventeenth-century 
frame of mind. Also, even if we understand the seventeenth-
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century contexts Hobbes has often given new and unusual 
meanings to the words he employs. Furthermore, we cannot 
rely too much on the views of Hobbes’s contemporary crit­
ics s for it is possible that their opinions were controlled 
more by indignation than by analysis. Any plausible inter­
pretation, then, must take into account manifold factors.
We have been concerned with the areas of disagree­
ment among the contemporary students of Hobbes. Their 
multiplicity only shows that virtually any meaning can be 
read into a theorist by utilizing certain parts of his 
works and disregarding others. Before these disagreements 
are commented on, however, a few prefatory remarks are in 
order.
It must be remembered that Hobbes wrote in a time- 
of crisis, a crisis in.-which both the civil and religious 
orders were being subjected to violent upheavals. His ma­
jor work, the Leviathan, was composed while he was a vol­
untary exile in Paris. In fact, this very book appeared in 
London at a critical juncture in Cromwell’s career, when, 
after his victory over the royalists at Worcester, he was 
strong enough to defy the Rump Parliament and usher in the 
Protectorate.
So out of a life intertwined with crisis after 
crisis came Hobbes’s major religious and political con­
ceptions. In Hobbes's mind the dread of war was the one 
irrefutable objection to civil reform. Among all of man’s
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demoniacal practices war was the worst; it was the supreme 
evil that levelled to the ground all of men’s accomplish- 
ments and aspirations0 For Hobbes conflict as such was not 
limited to the civil sphere, since no force was more dy­
namically destructive to the peace of the kingdom than 
religious controversy -- the endless sectarian disputes 
arising from the different interpretations of the Scrip­
tures.,
To Hobbes, the summum bonum in a civil state was 
peace and tranquility. Here, then, was Hobbes’s fundamen­
tal problems how to h-ave a state that would provide order 
and security in both the civil and religious spheres.
The present disputations divide themselves into 
several major areas. The first centers around the Hobbes- 
ian theory of moral and political obligation. The tradi­
tional interpretation appears to be the most plausible of 
those advanced, i.e., obligation derives from prudential 
self-interesto According to this explication, if there is 
a theory of moral obligation in Hobbes’s doctrine, it must 
be explained in terms of self-interest. The argument that 
Hobbes’s ethical theory is a deontology, a moral obligation
arising from a source other than society, is permeated "with
\inconsistencies and untenable assumptions, as has already 
been pointed out. The existence of a transcendent moral 
code has always been seriously questioned, and when one
■^Plamenatz, Nagel, and S. M. Brown, Jr., advance 
this very contention.
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considers the characteristics of the Hobbesian man:'.in a 
state of natures it is difficult to concede any type of 
moral obligation to him at alio Warrender’s own admis­
sion that the Hobbesian man always acts from the hope of 
some benefit or fear of some hurt to himself, makes the 
Taylor-Warrender thesis unsound# The Hobbesian man can 
never perform any action unless he believes it to be in 
his own self-interest, i.e., he is susceptible only to 
selfish motivation0 It is difficult to see how an egotis­
tical theory of motivation could be construed as a deon­
tology# Furthermore5 if Hobbes contends that the only 
thing which we can know about God is that He is the first 
cause of things, how can we know that He is the author of 
a set of moral laws# For examples there is Hobbes’s para­
graph concerning what man knows about God#
So that it is impossible to make any 
profound inquiry into natural causes, with­
out being inclined thereby to believe there 
is one God eternal; though they cannot have 
any idea of him in their minds answerable to 
their nature# For as a man that is born 
blind8 hearing men talk of warming themselves 
by the fire8 and being brought .to warm .him­
self 8 by the same,, may easily conceive, and 
assure himself, there is somewhat there, 
which men call fire. and is the cause of the 
heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is 
like; nor have any idea of it in his mind, 
such as they have that see it; so also by •• 
the visible things in the world, and their 
admirable order,, a man may conceive there 
is a cause of them, which men call God; and 
yet not have an idea, or image of him in his 
mind#l
Thomas Hobbes^: Leviathan# ed# Michael Oakeshott 
(Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1946), o9#
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Moral' laws to be obligatory must be the command 
of some one whose precept contains in it the reason of 
obedience. Therefore, if man cannot have an image or idea 
of God in his mind, how can he be constrained to obey His 
moral laws? In the state of nature where man is concerned 
with his immediate struggle for existence, the most he 
will do is to pay lip-service to an entity that he can 
neither conceive nor understand,.
Even in the civil state there is no obligation to 
obey God unless the sovereign wills it„ It seems rather 
ridiculous that the sovereign would have to command ob­
edience to God if there is already a prior obligation to 
obey Him. One ultimately realizes that without the sover­
eign’s command there would be no obligation to obey God, 
and hence the sovereign must constitute the source of au­
thority.
It is far more plausible to assume that in Hobbes’s 
state of nature there is no obligation, except that of 
pursuing one’s own self-interest. Furthermore, prudential 
self-interest furnishes a sufficient motive for continued 
obedience to the commands of the sovereign.
A second major area of disagreement revolves around 
the question of whether Hobbes was or was not an atheist. 
This is a rather difficult question to answer, but it is 
quite clear that Hobbes’s system, like any other mater­
ialistic system, is incompatible with theism. As stated
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above, Hobbes, when he did admit of a God, considered him 
only as the first cause, and as such incomprehensible. 
However, it is certain that if he meant what he said about 
religion, he cannot be called a Calvinist or a member of 
any other denomination. Any man who condemns religion as 
a parasite on fear does not endorse any seventeenth-cen­
tury creed. For Hobbes, the natural seed of religion con­
sists of four things; opinions of ghosts; ignorance of sec­
ond causes; devotion to that which men fear; and the taking 
of things causal for prognosticsMoreover, he contends 
that these things by reason of different fancies, judgments, 
and passions of men have grown up into ceremonies so dif­
ferent, that those which are used by one man, are for the 
most part ridiculous to another. Whether Hobbes is talking 
about theology with tongue in cheek is hard to discern, but 
one does not usually write this way and still retain a sin­
cere belief in religion.
A third area of controversy is concerned with the 
status of the Hobbesian laws of nature. One school of in­
terpretation contends that they are the commands of God, 
and therefore morally binding; whereas another school be­
lieves them to be general rules of reason for man’s self- 
preservation, and as such not morally obligatory. The lat­
ter view appears to be the more specious when one considers 
Hobbes’s own definition of a law of nature;
-*-Ibid., 72.
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A law of nature, lex naturalis. is a pre­
cept or general rule, found out by reason, 
which man is forbidden to do that, which is 
destructive of his life, or taketh away the 
means of preserving the same; and to admit 
that, by which he thinketh it may be best 
preservedol
Furthermore, it is difficult to construe the whole of Hob­
bes’s first law of nature as being the command of God. 
Conceivably, the first part could be a divine command, i.e., 
every man ought to endeavor peace and maintain it. How­
ever, certainly the second part is not a sacred law, which 
states ,that when men cannot obtain peace they may seek and
use all the helps and advantages of war for their self- 
2preservation.
At the present time there seems to be little hope 
that the intellectual disputations over the political phil­
osophy of Hobbes will be resolved. In fact, it is highly 
doubtful that they could ever be resolved, scholarly po-' 
lemics being what they are. In any event, the undergrad­
uate will still go on being instructed by the text^book 
writers, and Thomas Hobbes will continue to live in infamy.
^Ibid., 34« 
2Ibid.. 35o
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